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URING the Survey period, a large number of environmental
cases were decided and significant environmental legislation was
enacted in Texas. In the courts, a variety of interesting opinions
were issued by Texas appellate courts from criminal prosecutions to suits
for property damages, personal injury, and clean-up costs for environ-
mental emissions and contamination. Several criminal cases revealed im-
portant issues of statutory interpretation such as the meaning of what
water falls within the criminal provisions of the water code. One of the
more interesting cases was one of first impression. This case revealed an
apparently little used statutory provision under the Water Code that al-
lows parties who feel aggrieved by inaction by the Texas Natural Re-
source Conservation Commission ("TNRCC") to file suit to require the
agency to take action. As for environmental litigation for contaminated
property, parties involved in such litigation will find that the cases de-
cided in published and unpublished opinions provide good lessons for
prosecuting and defending these claims. Two cost recovery actions under
the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act were decided, which provide insight
into contribution protection for settling parties and what constitutes "ar-
ranging for disposal" under the Act that could result in liability for con-
tamination at a site. These cases provide insights into important aspects
of environmental law.
On the legislative side, the Texas Legislature passed significant envi-
ronmental legislation, particularly with passage of the TNRCC Sunset
legislation. The Legislature once again is changing the name of the
agency to the Texas Commission on Environmental Quality. The new
legislation makes a variety of other changes to Texas environmental law
and the operations of the agency. One important change is that the Leg-
islature has directed the TNRCC to use environmental compliance histo-
ries in permitting, inspection, and enforcement actions. This change has
already created controversy and concern within the regulated community
as the regulations are being developed to address this new process for
considering whether a company has a poor compliance record and what
the impact will be on such a company. Compliance efforts may be a fur-
ther focus of the agency with the legislation that now requires the agency
to create an incentive program for parties that implement environmental
management systems. The life of the Petroleum Storage Tank Remedia-
tion Fund has been extended out to 2006, and new deadlines have been
imposed to maintain one's eligibility for reimbursement under the fund.
Water rights and water management were once again the subject of legis-
lation. Numerous other changes were made that have significant implica-
tions for regulated parties.
The environmental practitioner will find important information and
many issues to review in this year's Survey. The courts and the Legisla-




A. AGENCY ACTIONS AND ENFORCEMENT
1. Citizens Can Compel the TNRCC or its Executive Director to Show
Why the Agency Should Not Take Immediate Action When
It Fails to Act in a Reasonable Time
One of the most intriguing cases during the Survey period is Larry
Koch, Inc. v. TNRCC.1 In this case, a party was attempting to force the
Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission to take action to in-
vestigate a benzene release to groundwater and require remediation by a
responsible party. Frustrated by the alleged inaction by the agency, Koch
filed suit against the TNRCC to compel the agency to explain why it
should not take immediate action when it failed to investigate the release
under the State Superfund provisions of the Texas Solid Waste Disposal
Act. While the trial court dismissed the action, the appellate court ruled
that Section 5.352 of the Water Code provides an exception to the doc-
trines of primary and exclusive jurisdiction and rejected the agency's
other defenses to this provision.2
As background, the matter arose as a result of the Texas Department
of Health's requesting that the TNRCC investigate the detection of ben-
zene in several wells drilled within the jurisdictional area, the Three
Lakes Municipal District No. 1. The levels in samples collected from the
wells apparently exceeded the Safe Drinking Water Act level for ben-
zene. According to the opinion, the TNRCC investigated the release but
did not determine the source of the benzene release. As a result of the
presence of benzene in groundwater, the federal Department of Housing
and Urban Development refused to provide mortgage insurance in the
Three Lakes Subdivision located near Tomball, Texas. The plaintiff Larry
Koch owned property in this subdivision.
Koch filed suit against certain oil field operators who had conducted
drilling and production of oil in the area of the subdivision. Koch claimed
that their activities caused the release of benzene to the groundwater. He
also sued the TNRCC under Section 5.352 of the Water Code to compel
action by the TNRCC. The suit against the TNRCC was severed from
the claims against the oil companies. It is the claim against the TNRCC
that the court addressed in this case.
The suit against the TNRCC focused on the procedure by which the
agency publishes the state registry for hazardous substance sites that pose
an imminent and substantial danger to public health or the environment,
sometimes referred to as the "State Superfund list," how the agency de-
termines which sites should be listed on the registry, and when and how
to investigate such sites.3 The suit also raised the issue of when the
TNRCC is required under Section 5.236(a)(2) to give notice to persons
1. 52 S.W.3d 833 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, pet. denied).
2. See id. at 841-42.
3. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 361.181-.184 (Vernon 2001).
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who are suspected of contributing to contamination at a particular site. 4
Koch alleged that the TNRCC and its executive director failed to meet
their statutory duties by failing to list the area around Tomball where
benzene and other toxic substances had contaminated the groundwater as
one of the state superfund sites and by failing to give notice to the parties
suspected of contributing to this condition. Koch alleged that the
TNRCC had been allowed a reasonable time to take these actions.
To better understand this case, it is important to review Section 5.352
of the Water Code. This section provides as follows:
A person affected by the failure of the commission or the executive
director to act in a reasonable time on an application to appropriate
water or to perform any other duty with reasonable promptness may
file a petition to compel the commission or the executive director to
show cause why it should not be directed to take immediate action.5
In attempting to utilize this provision to force agency action, Koch
asked in his pleading that the TNRCC be required to list the contami-
nated area on the State Registry or investigate the area and consider it
for listing, and that the TNRCC be ordered to provide the notice as re-
quired under Section 5.236 of the Water Code to those persons who are
suspected of contributing to the contamination of the aquifer. The
TNRCC challenged Koch's cause of action on several grounds and the
trial court dismissed all of Koch's claims without stating the basis for its
action.
On appeal, the TNRCC raised several defenses to the Section 5.352
claim. First, the agency asserted sovereign immunity. The agency inter-
preted this provision to apply as a mandamus-like process that applies to
a duty that is ministerial, plain, and clearly defined, not where agency
discretion is involved. The agency cited various statutes allowing agency
discretion under the listing process of the State Registry.
The court did not agree with this construction of Section 5.352. In a
case of first impression, the Austin Court of Appeals read this provision
to waive the State's sovereign immunity where a party is affected by the
TNRCC's failure to act timely. The provision also provides a remedy for
the aggrieved party in the form of a suit filed in the Travis County District
Court. The court pointed out that this provision is similar to Section
706(1) of the federal Administrative Procedure Act (APA). 6 The court
noted that Section 706(1) of the federal APA allows parties to require
governmental agency action based typically on a court imposed timetable.
The second argument that the provision does not apply to the State
Registry listing, which is governed by the Health and Safety Code, was
that the provision only applies to duties arising under the Water Code.
The court rejected this argument on the basis that the Water Code de-
scribes the agency duties under the Water Code and the Health and
4. 52 S.W.2d at 836.
5. TEX. WATER CODE § 5.352 (Vernon 2001).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1) (2001).
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Safety Code.7 Thus, the court concluded, the legislature brought the du-
ties of the TNRCC under the Health and Safety Code under the scope of
Section 5.352 of the Water Code.
The agency then turned to the defense that Koch failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies. The agency, however, did not identify any ad-
ministrative remedy Koch could pursue. Moreover, the court determined
that the principles behind the requirement of exhaustion of administra-
tive remedies do not apply where the agency purports to act outside its
statutory powers, nor where the agency fails to perform a statutory duty
with reasonable promptness. 8 In that case, the court wisely observed that
only a judicial remedy would apply where the agency is refusing to take
action; an administrative appeal would appear futile.
The next approach by the agency was to plead that Koch lacked stand-
ing to seek relief for failure of the TNRCC to provide notice to parties
who may have contributed to the contamination. Here the agency's argu-
ment is somewhat humorous. The agency takes the position that no
standing exists, because Koch is not among the parties to whom notice
would be made and, therefore, is not prejudiced by such failure to receive
notice. However, the court ruled that Koch was prejudiced because the
notice was not sent to the persons suspected of contributing to the pollu-
tion, which is a necessary step in the process of remediating the problem.
The court ruled that Koch had been prejudiced by the agency's delay in
carrying out its duty to provide notice, since no action had been taken by
the TNRCC to address the contamination.
The agency also challenged Koch's course of action under the doctrines
of exclusive and primary jurisdiction of the agency. The TNRCC's posi-
tion was that it is the agency's, rather than the court's, role to determine
whether a site should be listed on the State Registry. In response, the
court ruled that the legislature specifically gave the Austin courts the
power to review the agency's exercise of a duty, whether under its pri-
mary or exclusive jurisdiction, and to determine whether it should be
compelled to take immediate action in instances of unreasonable delay.
Thus, the agency's arguments were rejected, because specific statutory
authority provided for the Austin courts to address these issues.
Finally, the TNRCC argued the matter was moot in that the agency was
considering listing the site on the State Registry as requested by Koch.
The court ruled that the controversy was still alive, because the question
was whether the TNRCC should be compelled to take action as a result
of its unreasonable delay.
For these reasons, the court remanded the matter back to the trial
court for review of the cause of action under Section 5.352. In so doing,
an interesting power, apparently previously untapped in a case that
reached the court of appeals, is revealed to parties aggrieved by TNRCC
delay in exercising its duties. In this case, the plaintiff was a party com-
7. 52 S.W.3d at 839 (citing TEX. WATER CODE § 5.012(a)(12)).
8. See id. at 839-40.
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plaining of an industrial activity and the TNRCC's alleged failure to
timely address and remedy the condition. In other cases, industrial plain-
tiffs may be able to use this provision to compel the agency to issue or
process permits, to issue Voluntary Cleanup Program certificates of com-
pletion, or to compel other agency action that is being unreasonably
delayed by the TNRCC. Thus, this case and Section 5.352 may provide a
newly discovered avenue for making the agency act timely in those cases
where, for whatever reason, it fails or refuses to fulfill its duties without
unreasonable delay.
2. Criminal Prosecution under State Environmental Statutes
Three criminal cases were considered in the two Houston Courts of
Appeals during the Survey period.9 All three involved allegations of
criminal violation of the Texas Water Code for water pollution or disposal
that could lead to water pollution. Two of the cases involved discharges
of domestic sewage at a residence, and one involved the discharge of oil
to land.
a. Waters in the State
One of the issues that arose in Watts v. State,10 was the meaning of
"adjacent to waters of the State" in the criminal provision of the Texas
Water Code. In this case, the defendant allegedly, in addition to leaving
trash and debris around his trailer home, had allowed the discharge of
sewage to his yard from a broken sewage pipe. After several warnings
and visits by the Harris County Health Department and the Sheriff's
Deputies, John Watts was arrested and prosecuted for violation of Sec-
tion 7.145 of the Texas Water Code. This provision provides for criminal
prosecution for intentional and knowing unauthorized discharges of
waste or a pollutant "into or adjacent to water in the state" that causes or
threatens to cause pollution unless discharged within the parameters of a
permit, order, or regulation." The issue of whether the discharge was
adjacent to waters of the state first involved whether a drainage ditch fit
within the statutory definition of "waters in the state." The trial court
took judicial notice of a Court of Criminal Appeals decision that a
"'drainage ditch' is a watercourse that falls within the scope of the Water
Code's statutory definition of 'water' and 'waters in the state." 12 The
Houston Fourteenth District Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's
taking judicial notice of the Court of Criminal Appeals' holding and in-
struction to the jury that the drainage ditch was a water in the state.
9. Landry v. State of Texas, 60 S.W.3d 263 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no
pet. h.); Watts v. State, 56 S.W.3d 694 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet. h.); B
& B Iron & Metal Co., Inc. v. State, No. 01-00-009650-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1363
(Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 26, 2001, pet. ref'd).
10. 56 S.W.3d 694.
11. TEX. WATER CODE § 7.145(a) (Vernon 2001).
12. Watts, 56 S.W.3d at 702 (citing Am. Plant Food Corp. v. State, 587 S.W.2d 679
(Tex. Crim. App. 1979)).
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b. Adjacent to Waters in the State
Having addressed that issue, the question of whether the discharge was
"adjacent" to water in the state could be addressed. The defendant's po-
sition was that the conclusion that a discharge 50 yards away from a wa-
tercourse is adjacent to water in the state defies common sense and
stretches the term "adjacent." Since the term is not defined in the Water
Code, the appellate court looked to the common definition of adjacent.
The court cited a dictionary for the definition of "adjacent" as "not dis-
tant or far off" and "nearby but not touching. ' 13 The court deferred to
the fact finder and concluded that the discharge of sewage within one
hundred and fifty feet of water in the state "falls within the plain, ordi-
nary meaning of the term 'adjacent' and is sufficient evidence to support
the jury's determination that appellant discharged a waste or a pollutant
into or adjacent to water in the state."' 14 In addition, one officer testified
that he saw sewage in a trench that flows away from the trailers and saw
discharge in the "ditch area. ' 15 Thus, the court concluded there was suf-
ficient evidence to support the jury's conclusion that sewage was dis-
charged "adjacent" to waters in the state. 16
The appellant also challenged the constitutionality of the use of the
term "adjacent" in the criminal provision. He argued that the term is
unconstitutionally vague and impermissibly broad. Thus, the term did
not provide the appellant notice as to what conduct was prohibited. Cit-
ing a prior opinion of the court, it set the standard for providing sufficient
information regarding what behavior is prohibited, not as a mathematical
precision, but only as "fair warning of the conduct proscribed and...
guidelines for law enforcement.' 7 Using this test, the court in Watts con-
cluded that the term "'adjacent' is a simple word with a plain meaning
that clearly conveys to the public the legislature's intent to criminalize the
discharge of a waste or pollutant into or near water in the state. '18
This court did not take a very close look at the term "adjacent." A
distance of 150 feet from a watercourse hardly would seem to meet a
common sense definition of adjacent, particularly where a person is fac-
ing incarceration and substantial fines. While the factual question of
whether the distance of a discharge to a water course should be deter-
mined by a jury, or judge if acting as fact finder, the definition of the term
would appear to be a legal question. The court should have set some
parameters for judging what adjacent means under these criminal provi-
sions of the Water Code. Deferring to the jury's judgment of what "adja-
cent" means would appear to abdicate the court's role in construing
statutory terms.
13. Id. at 703 (citing Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 26 (1993)).
14. Id.
15. Watts, 56 S.W.3d at 703.
16. Id.
17. Id. (citing Weyandt v. State, 35 S.W.3d 144, 155 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, no pet. h.)).
18. Id. at 704.
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This is particularly true where the appellant is challenging the vague-
ness of the term at issue. In order to avoid the potential for various juries
to interpret the term differently, and thereby not providing "fair warning
of the conduct proscribed," the court should have addressed the hard
question of what "adjacent" means. This case provides insight into how
this court of appeals will view discharges on land and the potential crimi-
nal liability such discharges may create under the penal provisions of the
Water Code.
A more appropriate set of facts for showing that the discharge of a
pollutant was adjacent to waters in the state was Landry v. State,19 de-
cided by this same appellate court in another criminal conviction for
water pollution. In Landry, the defendant and later appellant, had been
discharging sewage from his septic tank that he claimed had become
clogged. A plastic pipe from his backyard ran four or five feet from a
bayou.20 He was convicted and fined $50,000.21
On appeal, one of the issues the court reviewed was whether the dis-
charge was into or adjacent to waters in the state.2 2 The evidence intro-
duced at trial consisted of a picture showing a V-shaped wet area
narrowing as it approached the bayou and testimony of a Houston police
officer that the dampness went down to the bayou.23 The court con-
cluded this was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding that the
discharge occurred "adjacent" to waters in the state. The defendant was
apparently arguing that the discharge did not flow directly into the bayou
but was on private property away from the bayou. However, the court
did not provide, or perhaps counsel for the defendant did not provide, a
clear articulation of the defendant's position or legal argument. Thus, the
court did not find it difficult to conclude a discharge a few feet from the
bayou met the definition of "adjacent."
A few feet from waters in the state, rather than 150 feet, would better
define the parameters of the term "adjacent" for purposes of the penal
provisions of the Water Code. The Houston appellate court did not apply
a common sense definition of the term when it concluded a distance of
150 feet was "close enough" to allow a criminal conviction. It is not clear
how far away a discharge would have to be from a water course to pre-
vent the government from obtaining a conviction of a defendant under
the Water Code.
c. Mens Rea
Another issue involved in the Waters case was mens rea. Section 7.145
of the Water Code requires that the person act intentionally or knowingly
19. 60 S.W.3d 263.
20. Id. at 264.
21. Id.




to discharge or allow a discharge.24 The defendant claimed he did not
intentionally discharge the sewage. The defendant claimed he simply
"failed to timely clean-up an unavoidable discharge. '2 5 He argued a pipe
was broken in the rear of his property, and the release occurred without
any affirmative action on his part. However, the court rejected this claim
based upon testimony that the defendant was repeatedly warned by the
county health inspectors to stop the discharge and did nothing to do so.
The court concluded that he either intentionally or knowingly discharged
the sewage or at least allowed it to continue.
d. Collateral Estoppel
In B & B Iron and Metal Co. v. Bazarsky,26 the defendant was con-
victed of knowingly disposing of used oil on land under Section
7.176(a)(2) of the Water Code. The defendant challenged this conviction
on appeal, because he had been acquitted on another felony water pollu-
tion charge three years before. The prior trial had been based upon what
is now Section 7.145(a) of the Water Code. The defendants asserted that
the conviction was barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel em-
bodied in the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and the double
jeopardy prohibition under article I, section 14 of the Texas Constitution.
The court focused on the collateral estoppel issue, because appellant
failed to cite any authority for the double jeopardy provision of the Texas
Constitution and failed to show how it materially differed from the fed-
eral constitutional challenge.
The test for collateral estoppel and how the court applied this test is
quite interesting. The test is whether a rational jury in the first proceed-
ing could have based its verdict on a factual matter other than that which
the defendant seeks to foreclose from consideration by the second jury.27
The defendant took the position that both verdicts were based on the
question of the identity of the party who disposed of the oil. However,
the court looked at the original defense to see if the acquittal could have
been based on the conclusion that the prosecution failed to prove an ele-
ment of the first offense that is not an element of the second prosecu-
tion.28 The court identified the issue of whether the oil was placed
adjacent to water in the state as the first offense on which the jury could
have based its acquittal. The court concluded that the jury could have
concluded that 300 feet was not "adjacent" to the storm sewer. Thus, the
identity issue was not the only issue on which the jury could have based
its decision.
24. TEX. WATER CODE § 7.145 (Vernon 2001).
25. Watts, 56 S.W.3d at 702.
26. No. 01-00-00965-CR, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 1363 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
Feb. 26, 2001, pet. ref'd).
27. Id. at *5 (citing Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970)).
28. Id. at **5-6 (citing Ladner v. State, 780 S.W.2d 247, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).
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The court noted in a footnote that, while it agreed with the State on the
legal authority that required the decision, "this panel cannot help but re-
gard this result as unfair."' 29 In fact it does seem extremely unfair that a
prosecutor can try a party who is found innocent in the first trial and then
file another case against the same party for the same alleged wrongdoing.
The prosecutor can simply assert a similar offense, but with one different
element, and re-try the defendant. This would allow a persistent, or vin-
dictive, prosecutor to put a person through a sort of judicial gauntlet of
several trials over many years.
e. Does the Texas Whistleblower Act Protect an Employee from
His Own Criminal Act?
The case of Gold v. City of College Station30 poses the provocative
question of whether the Texas Whistleblower Act protects an employee
from his own criminal act. Here, the appellant, Gold, challenged a sum-
mary judgment against his claim of wrongful discharge based upon the
Texas Whistleblower Act (the "Whistleblower Act"). 31
Gold, was one of the two top managerial employees of the Rock Prai-
rie Landfill in College Station and worked at the landfill for more than
twelve years. Gold and his supervisor had carried on an acrimonious re-
lationship for many years, and both had been warned they would be fired
if they could not learn to get along and work together. Following receipt
of a written reprimand from his supervisor putting him on six months'
probation for spilling leachate, Gold scheduled a meeting with the execu-
tive director of the Brazos Valley Solid Waste Management Agency
("BVSWMA"), which operated the landfill for the cities of College Sta-
tion and Bryan.32 At the meeting, which his supervisor attended, Gold
told the executive director that the reprimand was unfair because his su-
pervisor knew of prior leachate spills, had tacitly encouraged the spills,
and that other, more egregious violations had occurred than spilling
leachate.33 Gold reported past violations, including discharging contami-
nated water into a nearby creek and improperly disposing of waste
outside of the lined landfill. The supervisor denied Gold's allegation that
he knew about these violations.
Following an investigation, which included excavation that confirmed
Gold's report of improper disposal, the BVSWMA fired Gold. The su-
pervisor resigned, having been presented the choice of resignation or ter-
mination. Gold then brought suit against the City of College Station,
29. Id. at *11 n.6.
30. 40 S.W.3d 637 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. granted, cause dism'd).
31. See TEX. Gov'r CODE ANN. §§ 554.001-.009 (Vernon Supp. 2001). The Act pro-
hibits a governmental entity from terminating an employee who reports a violation of law
by the governmental entity to another public employee or to an appropriate law enforce-
ment authority.
32. 40 S.W.3d at 641-42.
33. Id. at 642.
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City of Bryan and BVSWMA ("governmental entities"), claiming viola-
tion of the Whistleblower Act.
At trial, the governmental entities sought summary judgment on the
grounds that Gold's report of his own illegal activity is not protected,
Gold's illegal conduct provided a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason to
terminate him, and Gold had no evidence to prove he was discharged
because he had reported a violation. The trial court granted the govern-
mental entities' motion without stating the grounds for its decision. On
appeal, the court reversed and remanded the case, holding that a public
employee can still benefit from the protection of the Act even if he par-
ticipated in the unlawful conduct he reported, so as long as he can estab-
lish the requisite elements for a whistleblower claim.34 However, the
Texas Supreme Court granted the governmental entities' petition for re-
view, following which the parties settled, and the cause was dismissed.35
Therefore, whether the Whistleblower Act protects an employee who
participated in the unlawful conduct he reported remains unsettled be-
cause of the final disposition of their case.
B. ENVIRONMENTAL TORTS
1. Government Agencies Do Not Necessarily Have Exclusive
Jurisdiction of Pollution Issues Raised in Environmental
Suits
In environmental suits where soil or groundwater contamination is al-
leged, it is common for a governmental agency to be involved in review-
ing the investigation and remediation of the contamination involved in
the suit. While the Amarillo Court of Appeals ruled, in an unpublished
opinion, that no exclusive or primary jurisdiction applied, other courts, as
in Z.A.O. Inc. v. Yarbrough Drive Center Joint Venture,36 ruled that the
agency's decision as to the issue of what clean-up level applies is disposi-
tive of the case. Thus, the question is whether a court should abate a case
until the agency makes that decision. To add another complication, the
TNRCC has generally applied a policy, included in its new Texas Risk
Reduction Rules, that a landowner must approve a clean-up approach
before the agency reaches its decision. If that landowner is in litigation
with the responsible party, approval by the landowner is unlikely to be
forthcoming. Thus, the interplay between the regulations, the regulatory
agency, the litigants, and the courts often prove challenging to parties
litigating environmental suits.
34. Id. at 649.
35. City of College Station v. Gold, No. 01-0200, 2001 Tex. LEXIS 123 (Tex. Dec. 13,
2001).
36. 50 S.W.3d 531 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 2001, no pet. h.) (discussed infra).
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a. Jurisdiction of the Railroad Commission over Suits for Property
Damage by Pollution from Oil and Gas Production
In the case In re Apache Corp.,37 the Amarillo Court of Appeals de-
nied Apache's petition for mandamus to order the trial judge to abate a
property damage suit pending disposition of administrative proceedings
relating to the pollution at issue in the lawsuit before the Texas Railroad
Commission ("TRC"). The plaintiff, Ray Marion, sought damages
against Apache under multiple tort theories for destruction of crops and
groundwater contamination caused by water pollution from leaking oil
and gas wells. 38 However, before this suit was filed, the TRC began pro-
ceedings to abate the pollution based upon Marion's earlier complaint to
the agency. 39 Apache claimed that the doctrines of exclusive and primary
jurisdiction compelled the trial court to abate the case pending the com-
pletion of the TRC's proceeding to abate the pollution.40 Apache
founded its position on section 26.131 of the Water Code, which provides
that the TRC is "solely responsible" for the control and disposition of
waste and the abatement of pollution of subsurface water from oil and
gas exploration and production. Apache argued that this section granted
exclusive jurisdiction to the TRC over such matters, mandating abate-
ment of the case until the TRC had completed its proceeding.41
The court reviewed the many grants of agency jurisdiction in Chapter
26 of the Water Code, and reasoned that the Legislature promulgated
section 26.131 to avoid jurisdictional disputes between the TRC and the
TNRCC over the control and disposition of waste and the abatement of
water pollution associated with oil and gas exploration and production
activities.42 However, the court concluded that the question presented in
this case did not involve TNRCC-TRC jurisdiction. The issue before the
court dealt with the jurisdiction between the TRC and the courts over
relief for damages from water pollution associated with oil and gas pro-
duction activities.
The court focused on three statutes in the Natural Resource Code, not-
ing that each authorizes causes of action for damages and/or other re-
lief.43 In section 85.321, the court found unmistakable legislative intent to
allow property owners injured due to a violation of a TRC rule or order
to sue for and recover damages and other relief. In section 85.322, the
37. 61 S.W.3d 432 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2001, no pet. h.).
38. Plaintiff sought relief on grounds of trespass, negligence, negligence per se, nui-
sance, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and strict liability. Id. at
10.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. In re Apache Corp., 61 S.W.3d at 5.
43. Id. at *6-7. Section 85.321 provides, in part, that one "who owns an interest in
property . . . that may be damaged by another violating . . . another law of this state
prohibiting waste or a valid rule or order of the Commission may sue for and recover
damages and have any other relief to which he may be entitled at law or in equity." TEX.
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 85.321 (Vernon 2001).
[Vol. 55
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
court found legislative intent that such suits proceed without delay.44 Fi-
nally, through section 91.00345 the court found legislative intent that the
TRC's authority to abate pollution through section 26.131 of the Water
Code or section 91.131 of the Natural Resources Code is expressly sub-
ject to the provisions in Chapter 85, including sections 85.321 and 85.322.
The court was satisfied that these provisions clearly indicate that the
TRC does not have exclusive jurisdiction over the abatement of or pay-
ment of damages associated with groundwater contamination caused by
oil and gas production.46 Further, because there is no statute vesting the
TRC with exclusive authority over common law actions to abate or rem-
edy such contamination, the court concluded that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction was not applicable in this case. 47
2. No-Evidence Motions for Summary Judgment
The no-evidence motions for summary judgment have grown, as a de-
fendant's weapon in environmental litigation. In environmental cases,
the issues from a regulatory and scientific basis can be complicated and
may require several experts to prove a plaintiff's case. The published and
unpublished decisions from the courts of appeals provide good lessons for
both plaintiffs and defendants in these types of cases to prepare to prose-
cute or defend them.
a. Trial Court Properly Granted No-Evidence Summary Judgment
When Expert Testimony Was Appropriately Struck and
No Evidence of Causation Was Provided
In Martinez v. City of San Antonio, the San Antonio Court of Appeals
reviewed issues regarding the timing of considering a no-evidence motion
for summary judgment, the admissibility of expert testimony, and what
constitutes causation evidence. 48 The case involved a suit by 600 re-
sidents of a neighborhood surrounding San Antonio's Alamodome sports
complex, who claimed that they were injured as a result of exposure to
"fugitive dust" that contained lead and was disseminated throughout the
neighborhood during construction of the Alamodome sports complex.49
The residents sued the City of San Antonio, the developer of the
Alamodome sports complex, and the prior owner of an iron foundry that
44. Section 85.322 provides, in part, that "no suit by or against the commission ... or
order of the commission shall impair or abridge or delay a cause of action for damages or
other relief that an owner of land ... may have or assert against any party violating any
rule or order of the commission." Id. § 85.322.
45. This section provides that the TRC may enforce "this chapter or any rule, order or
permit.., in the manner and subject to the conditions provided in Chapters 81 and 85 of
this code, including the authority to seek and obtain civil penalties and injunctive relief as
provided by those chapters." Id. § 91.003.
46. In re Apache, 61 S.W.3d at 8.
47. Id. at 11.
48. 40 S.W.3d 587, 589-590 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied).
49. Id. at 589.
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was operated at the Alamodome site from 1884 to 1989.50 The residents
had hired two expert witnesses, whose testimony was struck by the trial
court.5' The residents appealed the trial court's granting of no-evidence
summary judgments, arguing that the summary judgment motions were
prematurely considered and that the plaintiffs had presented sufficient
evidence in their responses to defeat the summary judgment motions.52
i. Timing of Consideration of No-Evidence Motion for Summary
Judgment
On appeal, the residents argued that they were not allowed adequate
time for discovery before the trial court entered the no-evidence sum-
mary judgments. 53 Relying on notes and comments regarding Texas Rule
of Civil Procedure 166a(i), 54 the residents complained that the trial court
acted improperly by entering judgments before the expiration of the dis-
covery period.55 The court noted that in Texas, appellate courts have not
overturned no-evidence summary judgments for failure to allow adequate
time for discovery. 56 The court evaluated the circumstances of the case
and concluded that the five years the case had been pending was an ade-
quate time for the residents to conduct discovery. 5 7 In addition, the court
presumed that the residents duly investigated the case before filing suit
and noted that the residents had agreed to a motion setting the summary
judgment hearings before expiration of the discovery period.58 Conse-
quently, the court held that the court's consideration of the no-evidence
motion for summary judgment before the end of the discovery period did
not deprive the residents of an adequate time for discovery.59
ii. Admissibility of Expert Testimony
The residents argued that the trial court erred in striking their experts'
testimony that lead in soils originating from the Alamodome site was dis-
persed throughout their neighborhood during construction of the
Alamodome sports complex.60 The court recognized that it could not
overturn the trial court's exclusion of expert testimony unless the trial
court had abused its discretion by acting "arbitrarily, unreasonably, or
50. Id.
51. Id. at 589-90. The case was appealed from the 131st Judicial District Court, Bexar
County, Texas, Honorable David Peeples, Judge Presiding.
52. Id. at 590-91.
53. Id.
54. "A discovery period set by pretrial order should be adequate opportunity for dis-
covery unless there is a showing to the contrary, and ordinarily a motion under paragraph
(i) would be permitted after the period but not before." TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) cmt.




59. Id. at 592.
60. Martinez, 40 S.W.3d at 592.
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without reference to guiding rules or principles."'61 The question of
whether the testimony of the residents' experts was admissible turned on
the reliability of that testimony.62 The court reviewed the testimony of
each expert individually to consider whether the trial court had abused its
discretion.63
The court concluded that striking the testimony of Dr. Jack V. Matson
was not an abuse of discretion because Dr. Matson employed his own
independent methodology that was not sufficiently supported. 64 Dr. Mat-
son had derived an "enrichment factor" to add to his calculations regard-
ing the amount of lead present in the fugitive dust emitted during
construction of the Alamodome sports complex. 65 Although Dr. Matson
relied on a study regarding lead contamination from a New Mexico lead
smelting facility in using the "enrichment factor," the court was troubled
by the lack of demonstrated similarities between the facilities, soils, distri-
bution of lead, and meteorology in New Mexico and San Antonio.66
Moreover, the court found that Dr. Matson derived the "enrichment fac-
tor" before locating the New Mexico report to support his conclusion.67
Because Dr. Matson' calculations were unreliable, the court concluded
that the testimony of Dr. Colin J. Baynes was also unreliable.68 Dr.
Baynes used Dr. Matson's calculations to arrive at conclusions regarding
the amount of lead emitted during construction of the Alamodome sports
complex.69 The court stated that although Dr. Baynes's methodology
may be accepted and reliable, his use of unreliable calculations renders
his opinion unreliable. 70 Consequently, the court held that striking Dr.
Baynes's testimony was not an abuse of discretion.71
iii. What Constitutes Causation Evidence
The residents argued that they presented sufficient causation evidence
to defeat the no-evidence motion for summary judgment.72 Although the
residents presented evidence from several experts regarding the presence
of lead in soils at the Alamodome site, the presence of lead in dust col-
lected from residents' homes, elevated levels of lead in the blood of
neighborhood children, symptoms of residents consistent with lead
poisoning, and construction activities involving the movement of lead-
contaminated soils, the court concluded that the expert testimony
61. Id. (citing W.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, 923 S.W.2d 549, 558 (Tex.
1995)).
62. Id. at 593.
63. Id. at 593-94.
64. Id.
65. Martinez, 40 S.W.3d at 593-94.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 594.
69. Id.





amounted to no evidence of causation. 73 The court discounted the testi-
mony of a physician who examined 49 neighborhood children, concluding
that the expert's report could not determine the source of the lead that
was creating symptoms in many of those children. 74 Similarly, the court
rejected the testimony of two medical experts whose testimony merely
established that neighborhood children are at risk for lead poisoning. 75
An elevated risk of injury is not sufficient to raise a fact issue on causa-
tion or create a genuine issue of material fact. 76
Finally, the court noted that the residents' expert testimony had not
negated other plausible causes of injury with a reasonable degree of cer-
tainty. 77 A no-evidence motion may not be overcome with an expert's
testimony that fails to rule out alternative causes of injury.78 The court
concluded that Dr. Matson's opinion did not constitute evidence, because
he did not consider any sources of lead emissions other than the
Alamodome site. 79 Accordingly, the court held that the residents
presented no evidence demonstrating that their injuries were caused by
the dissemination of lead associated with the Alamodome construction
activities. 80 The court affirmed the trial court's no-evidence summary
judgment.81
b. No Evidence of Causation
In Hess. v. McLean Feedyard, Inc.,82 the appellate court affirmed the
trial court's granting of a no-evidence summary judgment for the defen-
dant feedyard on the basis that there was no evidence of causation. The
landowners had sued the feedyard for damages allegedly caused by the
contamination of their surface and groundwater. McLean Feedyard, Inc.
owned 960 acres of land, and operated a commercial feedyard on approx-
imately 101 of these acres. The McLean property was located upgradient
and north of the landowners' properties. The feedyard collected and held
waste from the cattle and accumulated surface water and cattle waste into
a system of a series of lagoons. The discharge gates of the lagoons were
located approximately one mile from the nearest property owned by a
landowner. Over the course of several days of unprecedented heavy rain,
there were three overflow discharges from the retention ponds. Water
from the discharges passed the McLean property and entered a creek.
The landowners contended that McLean had contaminated their fresh
73. Id. at 594-95.
74. Id. at 595.
75. Martinez, 40 S.W.3d at 595.
76. Id. at 594 (citing Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 720 (Tex.
1997)).
77. Id. at 595 (citing Havner, 953 S.W.2d at 720).
78. Id. (citing Weiss v. Mech. Associated Servs., 989 S.W.2d 120, 125 (Tex. App.-San
Antonio 1999, pet. denied)).
79. Id.
80. Martinez, 40 S.W.3d at 594.
81. Id.
82. 59 S.W.3d 679 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 2002, pet. denied).
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water to the point that their underground and surface water was no
longer potable and was not suitable for consumption by man or live-
stock.8 3 McLean contended that most of the discharge was rain water,
and that any manure and byproducts in the creek would have been so
diluted by the huge volume of water in the creek that no damages were
caused to the landowners from the discharges.8 4
McLean filed a no-evidence motion for summary judgment asserting
that there was no evidence of causation and contending that it was enti-
tled to a traditional summary judgment under Rule 166a(c) of the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, because it had established the absence of causa-
tion as a matter of law.85 In response, the landowners submitted the affi-
davit of an expert witness who testified (1) that the feedyard had
contaminated the landowners' surface water to the point that it was no
longer potable, and was hazardous to humans, and (2) that the landown-
ers' underground fresh water contained high levels of coliform bacteria
which caused the underground fresh water to be non-potable, dangerous,
and hazardous to humans who consumed it.86 The feedyard objected and
moved to strike the affidavit of the expert witness. The trial court sus-
tained the feedyard's motion to strike the expert's affidavit and granted
the feedyard's motion for summary judgment.
In upholding the trial court's striking of the expert witness affidavit, the
appellate court held that the proponent of expert testimony by affidavit
in a summary judgment proceeding has the burden to provide an affidavit
which satisfies the requirements of summary judgment practice and the
requirements of Texas Rules of Evidence 702, 703, 104, and 403.87 The
court found that the portions of the affidavit that constituted conclusions
were not sufficient to raise an issue of fact. The affidavit failed to provide
supporting facts, and the expert's bare conclusions were not evidence.
The court held that under Rule of Evidence 703, an expert's opinion must
be based upon facts or data perceived or reviewed during or before trial.
An expert opinion regarding causation that is based completely upon
speculation and surmise amounts to no evidence. Because the expert's
opinion was based on his assumption of an unproved fact, the motion to
strike the opinion was properly granted.88
In addition, the court held that the expert should have carefully consid-
ered and ruled out alternative causes of the contamination, and the fail-
ure to rule out such alternative causes resulted in speculation and
conjecture and did not amount to any evidence of causation.8 9 The court
found that the expert's affidavit wholly failed to inform the reader of the
quality of the water before the events made the basis of the underlying




87. See 59 S.W.3d 679, 685.
88. Id. at 686.
89. Id. at 687.
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lawsuit.90 Because the reasoning of the expert was not based on known
or stated water quality before the heavy rains, the expert had reasoned
from an end result in order to hypothesize what was needed to be known,
but was not known or set out in his affidavit.91 Accordingly, the opinion
was based on conjecture or speculation about the water quality before the
heavy rains and could not constitute evidence of causation.92 Further-
more, even though the expert had attempted to rule out other potential
causes, the failure to ascertain and consider the water quality before the
heavy rain events made the effort to rule out other possible causes incom-
plete and, therefore, inconclusive. The court, therefore, concluded that
the trial court's action in striking the affidavit was not an abuse of
discretion. 93
Next, the court considered whether the trial court's grant of the feed-
yard's no-evidence summary judgment was proper. The court held that a
no-evidence summary judgment is essentially a pretrial directed verdict
and, therefore, applied the same legal sufficiency standard as applied in
reviewing a directed verdict.94 Because the court had upheld the striking
of the landowners' expert affidavit, the court found that the landowners
had not produced any expert testimony on the element of causation. The
court held that even if the expert's affidavit had been permitted, it still
provided no evidence of the unproven essential fact that the water was
potable before the heavy rains.95 The court held that even if the quality
of water could be the subject of non-expert testimony, a question not
decided by the court, the non-expert summary judgment evidence did not
discuss or establish the water quality before the events made the basis of
the underlying suit.96 The court found that this fact was essential to cre-
ate a fact issue on causation.97 The court, therefore, affirmed the trial
court's judgment.
c. Plaintiffs Must Assert Evidence of Elements of Cause of Action
to Defeat a No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment
In Aguirre v. Phillips Properties Inc.,98 the defendant landowner, on
whose land were located underground storage tanks, succeeded in ob-
taining a no-evidence motion for summary judgment under Rule 166a(i)
of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. This rule provides that a party
may move for a motion for summary judgment based upon the other
side's lack of evidence on an element of a cause of action or defense after
a reasonable time for discovery. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Hess, 59 S.W.3d 679, 687.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 638.
96. Id.
97. Hess, 59 S.W.2d at 638.
98. No. 13-00-426-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 5812 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Aug.
23, 2001, no pet.).
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went through each of the plaintiffs' causes of action and provided insight
as to what it believed would have to be shown by the plaintiffs to avoid
summary judgment. This case in that regard provides good insight into
one court's view regarding what is required to succeed with these
motions.
i. Negligence
The defendant challenged the plaintiffs' evidence on the following ele-
ments of their negligence cause of action: 1) the standard of care that the
owner of the property with the underground storage tanks would owe the
plaintiffs with respect to operation of their tanks; 2) the breach of that
standard of care; and 3) that the duty was in fact owed to the plaintiffs.
The court ruled that in considering what it would take to provide proof
on each of these elements the plaintiffs would have merely had to provide
an affidavit from their expert witness, without the need for additional
discovery.
Here, the court may have missed the point on one issue. An expert
could have provided an affidavit that described the proper manner of op-
erating an underground storage tank system, particularly in consideration
of the applicable regulations governing such tanks. The fact the duty was
owed to the adjoining property owner, whose groundwater was allegedly
contaminated, would not be difficult to address. However, the issue of
whether the defendant violated the standard of care could well have re-
quired discovery of the activities and documents of the defendant. Here
the question is how had the defendant in fact operated its underground
storage tank. How had fuel been monitored? How had the tanks been
maintained? How had they been installed? These facts would not neces-
sarily be known outside the use of discovery to find out what the defen-
dant had actually done. Other possible sources would be government
records, such as TNRCC records and perhaps city or county records. It is
not clear the appellate court fully understood these issues.
ii. Trespass Claim
As for the trespass claim, the defendant asserted that the plaintiffs
failed to provide proof of "the physical entry of contaminants onto their
property." 99 This was the basis for their claim of subsurface contamina-
tion, apparently groundwater contamination. The court concluded this
proof should have been readily available to the plaintiffs and should have
been part of the investigation prior to filing suit against the defendant.
The court was very pointed, "Without evidence of contamination on their
properties, [plaintiffs] would have had no claim against [defendants].' 100
Here the court concluded that the plaintiffs and their expert could have
submitted affidavits on the question of the physical entry of the contami-




nants on their property to defeat the no-evidence motion for summary
judgment. 0 1
iii. Causation
On the issue of causation, the court recognized that discovery would be
necessary. Relying upon Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Bartlett,10 2 the court
held that the factual issues for environmental tort claims, like those of the
plaintiffs, required them to prove the source of the release of contami-
nants originated with the defendant and that the released contaminants
then migrated to the plaintiffs' property and caused their injury. The
court observed that such evidence is usually expert testimony. Discovery
necessary for the expert to reach his or her opinion, the court noted,
would likely be physical discovery. One would assume the court means
that the discovery would require testing on the defendant's property.
The plaintiffs in this case argued that the discovery that was needed
was the ability to depose the defendants' experts and corporate represen-
tative. The court concluded this was not the type of physical evidence
that would appear to be necessary in most cases to defeat a no-evidence
motion for summary judgment. The court did not count this issue in
favor of plaintiffs' attempt to overturn the summary judgment issued
against them by the trial court.10 3
iv. Timing
The court looked as well at how long discovery had been possible. The
case had been filed for about three years. Discovery had been taken in
another related lawsuit. The court concluded this time period favored the
granting of summary judgment. However, the fact the trial court stayed
discovery one month before the judgment was granted favored denying
the motion. Considering all of the factors and evidence before it, the
Court of Appeals approved the granting of the summary judgment. 10 4
d. Sufficiency of Evidence to Survive a No-Evidence Motion for
Summary Judgment For Environmental Exposure Claims
Belasco v. Pennco, Inc.,105 an unpublished opinion out of the Houston
Court of Appeals, presents an overview of the environmental and expo-
sure evidence necessary to sustain a no-evidence motion for summary
judgment in an environmental property damage and personal injury suit.
In this case, seven members of the Belasco family filed suit against
Pennco, claiming they repeatedly detected noxious odors from Pennco's
plant and suffered various injuries and ill health due to chemicals re-
101. Id.
102. 958 S.W.2d 430, 446 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1997, pet. denied).
103. Id. at *12.
104. Aguirre, No. 13-00-426-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 5812 at **12-13.
105. No. 14-99-00832-CV, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 8172 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] Dec. 7, 2000, pet. denied).
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leased from the plant. The Pennco plant produces ferrous sulfate by com-
bining carbon steel with sulfuric acid and water. Ferrous sulfate is a non-
toxic but caustic material. Appellants, who lived three-fourths of a mile
from the plant, brought claims of nuisance, trespass, negligence, negli-
gence per se and gross negligence.
To support their nuisance claim,106 appellants offered their own affida-
vits asserting they were periodically subjected to noxious odors from the
Pennco plant. Appellants also offered several investigatory reports filed
by the TNRCC, in each of which the investigator reported he was unable
to detect any odor at the perimeter of Pennco's property. However, in
one of the reports, the TNRCC inspector noted that a Pennco supervisor
told him that fumes sometimes travel beyond the property lines when the
reactors are operating. The court found that this single admission by
Pennco was sufficient to overcome the motion for summary judgment, in
that it constituted more than a scintilla of proof to create a fact issue
regarding the nuisance claim. 10 7
For their trespass claim, appellants offered their own affidavits claiming
they witnessed a plume of brownish-yellow steam rising from Pennco's
plant and moving toward their property.10 8 However, because none of
the affidavits stated that the plume moved outside of the boundaries of
Pennco's property, the court ruled this was not sufficient to overcome the
summary judgment on the trespass claim.10 9
With respect to their claims for personal injury, negligence, negligence
per se, and gross negligence, appellants offered the affidavit of a former
Pennco employee to establish that Pennco contaminated adjacent prop-
erty with chemicals that had an adverse effect on appellants' health and
offered their own affidavits. In their own affidavits, appellants did not
specifically identify the toxic agent allegedly responsible for their injuries
but, instead, submitted a toxicologist's report on the harmful conse-
quences of inhaling sulfuric acid vapors. That report discussed the poten-
tial harm to humans from chronic exposure and postulated that sulfuric
acid fumes from the Pennco plant could harm respondents if Pennco was
releasing sufficient quantities of fumes. However, there was no evidence
in the record that harmful fumes ever migrated off Pennco's plant prop-
erty. The court found that the Pennco admission to the TNRCC investi-
gator that fumes sometimes travel beyond the property lines did not
106. The court advised that a nuisance occurs in one of three ways: (1) by physical harm
to the property, such as by encroachment of a damaging substance or property destruction;
(2) physical harm to a person on his property, such as by an assault on his senses or per-
sonal injury; and (3) by emotional harm to a person from the deprivation of the enjoyment
of his property, such as by fear, apprehension, offense, or loss of peace of mind. Id. at *4.
The court noted that polluting the atmosphere with noxious or offensive odors, gases or
vapors can become a nuisance if it causes material discomfort and annoyance to one resid-
ing in the area or injures their health or property. Id.
107. Id. at *5.




establish that toxic contaminants traveled beyond the property lines.110
The court further noted that the plume was composed primarily of steam,
that ferrous sulfate is non-toxic, and that there was no evidence that the
sulfuric acid vapors reached the appellants' property.1 '
With respect to appellants' personal injury claims, the court found that
the appellants' evidence consisted merely of bald assertions that the sul-
furic acid releases caused their injuries and illness.112 The assertions were
not supported by expert testimony or any empirical evidence, and the
medical evidence indicated that the deceased's death was due to compli-
cations from diabetes and respiratory failure from the flu. 113 Finally, the
court noted that the affidavit of the appellant who claimed he was hospi-
talized due to chemical exposure from the Pennco facility failed to iden-
tify his illness and offered no evidence to support that any illness was
caused by toxic chemical exposure. The court noted that appellants had
failed to meet their burden of establishing levels of exposure that are
dangerous to humans generally, proving they were injured by such a level
of exposure, and negating other plausible causes of their injuries or dam-
ages with reasonable certainty.' 14 The court noted that, in fact, the
TNRCC reports actually supported Pennco's assertion that there are
other plausible sources for the chemical odors and fumes which were the
basis of appellants' claims. On these bases, the court affirmed the trial
court's judgment on all counts, other than nuisance, and reversed and
remanded the nuisance claim to the trial court.115
3. Interpretation of Contracts in Environmental Damage Litigation
Another issue that is frequently litigated in environmental cases is the
meaning of contractual provisions, which frequently include representa-
tions and warranties, indemnities, and covenants for one party to address
a particular environmental condition.
a. Jury's Findings Regarding Terms of Purchase and Sale
Agreement Will Not Be Disturbed When Key Provision
of Agreement was Ambiguous
In Trinity Industries, Inc. v. Ashland, Inc., the Austin Court of Appeals
reviewed claims regarding the cleanup of contamination in connection
with the purchase and sale of a subsidiary company. 116 The issues arose
out of Trinity Industries, Inc.'s ("Trinity") purchase of Beaird Industries,
Inc. ("Beaird"), a subsidiary of Ashland, Inc. ("Ashland"). The Purchase
and Sale Agreement ("Agreement") related to that transaction required
Ashland to conduct an environmental audit of the Beaird facility. Ash-
110. Belasco, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 8172, at **7-8.
111. Id. at *8.
112. Id.
113. Id. at **8-9
114. Id. at **910.
115. Belasco, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 8172, at *10.
116. 53 S.W.3d 852, 857-859 (Tex. App.-Austin 2001, no pet. h.).
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land hired an environmental consulting firm to perform that audit, which
identified two areas of possible environmental contamination on the
property.1 7 The environmental consulting firm later conducted a Phase
II Environmental Assessment, during which it identified a soil-stained
area and the presence of trichloroethene ("TCE") in the groundwater
below the Beaird facility.
Following the Phase II Environmental Assessment, Ashland and Trin-
ity executed a Second Amendment to the Purchase Amendment ("Sec-
ond Amendment"), which defined the soil-stained area and groundwater
contamination as the "Identified Contamination. 11 8
The Purchase and Sale Agreement ("Agreement") related to that
transaction contained the following key provisions:
3.12(e). All Environmental Costs or other costs and expenses of
such Identified Contamination Remediation shall be paid by ...
Ashland ... without limitation.119
3.12(m). Notwithstanding any other provision of this Agreement to
the contrary, the obligations of Ashland ... described in Sections
3.12(e) and 5.2(a)(10) shall be limited to a maximum amount of Five
Hundred Thousand Dollars ($500,000).120
5.2(a)(10). Ashland [shall] indemnify and hold harmless Beaird and
[Trinity] .. .against any loss, liability, claim, damage, costs, or ex-
pense (including, without limitation,.., all Environmental Costs and
all costs of any required or necessary ... clean-up or detoxification
of any Subject Property ... remedial or other plans required by an
Environmental Agency . . .) resulting from any such untrue state-
ment, omission or breach of warranty. 121
After the sale of Beaird closed, Ashland hired the environmental con-
sulting firm to cleanup the Identified Contamination. After spending
$500,000 on that cleanup, Ashland cited section 3.12(m) of the Second
Amendment (above) and turned over remediation of the site to Trin-
ity. 122 Trinity sued Ashland for breach of the Agreement and fraud. The
jury found that Ashland's total obligation for cleanup of the Identified
Contamination would not exceed $500,000 under any circumstances. The
jury did not find Ashland liable for breach of contract or fraud. The trial
court rendered judgment against Trinity, who appealed the trial court's
judgment.1 23
On appeal, the Austin Court of Appeals reviewed issues relating to the
submission of an issue to the jury, the sufficiency of evidence supporting
the jury's finding, whether a jury question was conditional, denial of judg-
117. That audit was presumably a Phase I Environmental Assessment, although the
court's opinion does not provide any details of that investigation.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 860.
120. Id. at 859.
121. Trinity, 53 S.W.3d at 860.
122. Id. at 859.
123. Id. The case was appealed from the District Court of Dallas County, 160th Judicial
District, Honorable David C. Godbey, Judge Presiding.
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ment notwithstanding the verdict, failure to render judgment on attor-
ney's fees, and failure to grant a new trial.124
i. Submission of Issue to Jury
Trinity argued that the trial court's submission of the interpretation of
section 3.12(m) to the jury constituted harmful error. Trinity maintained
that section 3.12(m) is unambiguous as a matter of law and, consequently,
its construction was a matter of law for the court. The court acknowl-
edged that the trial court has broad discretion in submitting issues to the
jury and those determinations will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. 125 A trial court should only submit the meaning of a contract
to the jury if the contract is ambiguous.' 26 To determine if section
3.12(m) was ambiguous, the court analyzed section 3.12(m) in the context
of sections 3.12(e) and 5.2(a)(10). 127 The court found that "when analyz-
ing section 3.12(m) and the relevant provisions in their entirety, an ambi-
guity arises over the extent of Ashland's obligations to clean up the
Beaird property and indemnify Trinity for costs relating to such
cleanup."' 128 The court also looked at testimony in the record, which indi-
cated that the limitation in section 3.12(m) was a crucial element in the
closing of the sale.' 29 Because the court found that two contradictory
meanings arose from section 3.12(m) and the related provisions, the court
held that section 3.12(m) is ambiguous and the trial court did not err in
submitting the issue regarding interpretation of that provision to the
jury. 130 The court also instructed that, even if submitting the issue to the
jury did constitute error, such error was not harmful, because there was
no evidence that the jury's answer to a question regarding Ashland's fail-
ure to comply with the Agreement was affected by the jury's interpreta-
tion of section 3.12(m). 131
ii. Sufficiency of Evidence Supporting Jury's Finding
In the alternative to its argument regarding the jury issue, Trinity ar-
gued that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's interpreta-
tion of section 3.12(m). The court recognized that it is obligated to
uphold the jury's finding if it is supported by a scintilla of evidence,
meaning that the supporting evidence rises to a level that would enable
reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions. 32 The
court cited evidence of two Ashland witnesses, which the court concluded
124. Id. at 859-869.
125. Id. (citing Lindgren v. Delta Invs., 936 S.W.2d 422, 426 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996,
writ denied)).
126. Id. (citing Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 393-394 (Tex. 1983)).




131. Id. at 861.




enables reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in their conclusions
about the parties' agreement in section 3.12(m). 133 Accordingly, the
court found more than a scintilla of evidence supporting the jury's find-
ing.134 In addition, the court evaluated the testimony of Trinity's wit-
nesses and concluded that it could not say that the jury's finding was
supported by evidence so weak that the verdict was clearly wrong and
unjust. 135 Because the jury verdict was grounded in sufficient evidence,
the court upheld the jury's interpretation of section 3.12(m). 136
iii. Conditional Jury Question
Trinity argued that because the jury found that Ashland did not fail to
comply with the Agreement, the jury's finding that any failure of Ashland
to comply with the Agreement was excused was immaterial and not sup-
ported by legally or factually sufficient evidence. The court determined
that the third jury question, regarding an excuse for any Ashland non-
compliance, did not have any conditional language. 137 In fact, the court
indicated that the question gave the jury the option to find that, even if
Ashland did fail to comply with the Agreement, Ashland was excused
from that failure to comply.' 38
iv. Denial of Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict
Trinity argued that the trial court erred in its failure to grant Trinity's
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV") regarding
Ashland's liability for breach of contract and fraud. In its motion for
JNOV, Trinity had contended that it conclusively proved Ashland was
liable. A court may render JNOV when the evidence is conclusive and
one party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 139 In reviewing the
trial court's denial of JNOV, the court looked at the record to determine
if there was more than a scintilla of evidence to support the jury's find-
ings. 140 After reviewing evidence regarding breach of contract claims, in-
cluding Ashland's representations regarding the presence of hazardous
materials at the Beaird facility, environmental costs, ownership of neces-
sary licenses and permits, and compliance with applicable laws, the court
concluded that the evidence supported the jury's findings that Ashland
had not breached the Agreement.1 41 Similarly, the court reviewed evi-
dence regarding fraud claims, concluding that the evidence supported the
jury's finding that Ashland had not committed common law fraud or stat-
133. Id. at 862. The testimony of Ashland's witnesses supported Ashland's argument
that the parties agreed Ashland's liability would be capped at $500,000. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 862-63.
137. Trinity, 53 S.W.3d at 862-63.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 863 (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 301; Mancorp, Inc. v. Culpepper, 802 S.W.2d 226,
227-228 (Tex. 1990)).
140. Id. (citing Mancorp, 802 S.W.2d at 228).
141. Trinity, 53 S.W.3d at 864-67.
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utory fraud against Trinity.142 Accordingly, the court held that the trial
court properly denied Trinity's motion for JNOV.143
v. Failure to Render Judgment on Attorney's Fees
Trinity argued that the trial court erred by failing to render judgment in
favor of Trinity for $250,000 in attorney's fees and expenses related to
claims Ashland brought against Beaird for negligent misrepresentation
and fraud. Trinity contended that it conclusively proved that Ashland
breached section 6.2 of the Agreement, a release provision, by suing
Beaird. 144 The court applied a de novo standard of review because the
question of whether Ashland's conduct breached section 6.2 was a ques-
tion of law for the court to decide.1 45 Under that standard, the court
evaluated whether Ashland's obligations under section 6.2 included an
obligation to release Beaird from claims for negligent misrepresentation
and fraud. 146 The court cited the express negligence doctrine, which
mandates that a party seeking to be released from its own negligence
must expressly state that intent in specific, unambiguous terms within the
four corners of the document. 147 Because section 6.2 does not mention
negligent misrepresentation or fraud claims, the court concluded that the
Agreement did not release Beaird from such claims.148 Therefore, the
court agreed with the trial court that Ashland did not breach section 6.2
of the Agreement by suing Beaird. 149 The court also agreed with the trial
court's decision not to award attorney's fees to Trinity because no statu-
tory or contractual provision provided for recovery of attorney's fees. 150
vi. Failure to Grant New Trial
Trinity argued that the trial court's denial of its motion for a new trial
constituted error, because Trinity proved liability as a matter of law or,
alternatively, because the jury's answers were against the great weight of
the evidence. The court explained that under the correct standard of re-
view, the court could not disturb the trial court's decision in the absence
of an abuse of discretion. 51 The court rejected Trinity's argument be-
cause the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's findings that Ash-
142. Id. at 867.
143. Id.
144. Section 6.2 of the Agreement stated: "Ashland ... shall have ... released Beaird
from any and all claims, demands, debts and liabilities of any nature whatsoever." Id. at
867.
145. Trinity, 53 S.W.3d at 867 (citing Callaway v. Overholt, 796 S.W.2d 828, 831 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1990, writ denied); Tenet Health Ltd. v. Zamora, 13 S.W.3d 464, 468 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2000, pet. dism'd w.o.j.)).
146. Trinity, 53 S.W.3d at 867.
147. Id. at 868-69 (citing Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Page Petroleum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505,
508 (Tex. 1993)).
148. Id. at 869.
149. Id.
150. Id.




land complied with the Agreement and Ashland did not commit common
law or statutory fraud against Trinity.152 The court upheld the trial
court's denial of Trinity's motion for new trial.1 53
b. Suits Between Landlord and Tenants and Construction of Lease
Terms
In Z.A.O. Inc. v. Yarbrough Drive Center Joint Venture,154 a landlord
brought suit against a former tenant for alleged damages due to pollution
of soil from a former underground storage tank used by the tenant in its
operations of a gas station. This case involves many of the causes of ac-
tions and issues, ranging from interpretation of indemnities to the mea-
sure of damages, that are frequently seen in these cases that have become
fairly common. The case provides good tools for counsel defending these
types of cases as well as alerting prosecutors of potential pitfalls. One of
the more important issues for counsel defending these cases is the appar-
ent growing view among Texas Courts of Appeals that once the state
agency determines the appropriate cleanup level for environmental me-
dia, such as soil or groundwater, then the tort claim of the plaintiff may
be at an end. Thus, the state may set the floor by which damages are
measured in environmental tort cases involving claims of property
damage.
i. Proving Which Tenant Caused the Release
In many landlord-tenant environmental cases, multiple past tenants en-
gaged in the activity that released or that could have released the contam-
inant or contaminants at issue. Defendant tenants challenge the landlord
to prove which of the tenants discharged the contaminants. In Z.A.O.,
the issue was whether tenant Z.A.O. was the source of the release of
gasoline into the soil. The plaintiff, landlord Yarbrough, offered proof
that a chemical known as MTBE (methyl tert-butyl ether) was added to
gasoline beginning in the early to mid-1980s. Since Z.A.O. began its op-
erations in 1981 and terminated its lease sometime in 1994 as the last gas
station operator, the court concluded that it was sufficient proof that
Z.A.O. was very likely the source of the release of gasoline, rather than a
predecessor operator at the site.1 55 This evidence overcame the no-evi-
dence challenge as there was more than a scintilla of evidence to support
the jury's factual determination. The fact that there was no testing when
Z.A.O. took over the operations was not enough to show the evidence
was insufficient to prove a prior operator had not caused the release but
only that a prior operator could have contributed to the release. This, in
the court's view, did not show the jury's conclusion was against the great
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. 50 S.W.3d 531 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 2001, no pet.).
155. Id. at 539.
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weight and preponderance of the evidence.t 56
ii. Meaning, Ambiguity, and Intent of the Relevant Contractual
Indemnification Language
As is often the case where environmental coverage under a contract is
at issue, the meaning of the carefully drafted language of lawyers is put
under a microscope, and every word and phrase is parsed carefully by the
litigants and the judge. Each side asserts that its interpretation is the only
possible construction that makes any sense whatsoever, and the other
side's interpretation is a terribly strained construction which defies com-
mon sense.
In this case, the contractual language at issue, which is often the case in
environmental cases, was the meaning of the indemnification provision of
the contract. The lease agreement contained an indemnity whereby the
tenant would indemnify the landlord under certain circumstances and for
certain losses or claims. The question raised by the tenant was whether it
was required to bring the property to a "toxic-free condition." The ques-
tion to the court was whether the relevant provision of the contract re-
quired contractual duties in addition to the duty to indemnify the
landlord. The first part of the provision required indemnification of the
landlord for certain claims, demands, and losses and the second part re-
quired the tenant to "hold Lessor harmless from any and all ... expenses
... suffered by Lessor as a result of any hazardous or toxic substances
located in or under the soil of the leased premises."'157
Interestingly enough, neither party raised the question of ambiguity in
the trial of the case. The appellate court identified this issue on its own.
The court reviewed the jury charge and other issues on this point. The
court concluded that, although the issue of intent was not specifically put
to the jury, the jury's damages conclusion and the fact the parties allowed
the jury to decide the issue resulted in the conclusion that the issue of
intent was tried by consent of the parties.' 58
The court attacked this issue in two steps. First, it considered whether
the contract was ambiguous before moving to consider whether, if ambig-
uous, the parties' intent with respect to this provision was tried by con-
sent. The question of ambiguity is a question of law and is decided by the
court rather than the jury. It is not ambiguous if "it can be given a defi-
nite or certain meaning as a matter of law."' 159 A contract or a portion
thereof is ambiguous if the language in question can be given two reason-
able interpretations after applying the relevant rules of contractual con-
struction. The court ruled that assertion of differing interpretations does




159. Z.A.O., 50 S.W.3d at 539
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tions of the same language is what creates the fact issue of intent.160
The court then applied this reasonableness test to each party's con-
struction of the indemnity provision. The court then gave a rather sur-
prising and not convincing analysis of the defendant tenant's position.
The language of the provision is as follows: "Lessee agrees to indemnify
and hold lessor harmless from any and all claims, demands, losses or ex-
penses asserted against or suffered by Lessor as a result of any hazardous
or toxic substances located in or under the soil of the Leased
Premises.' 61
The court concluded that the tenant's interpretation that it only in-
cluded indemnification of claims asserted by third parties was reasonable,
because the language included language of indemnification of claims as-
serted against the landlord. 162 But this seems like an abbreviated analy-
sis. Just because a sentence with multiple portions stated in the
disjunctive contains one concept, it does not appear "reasonable" to read
it to exclude any other concepts listed in the sentence. Yet, that is exactly
what the court did.
This is clear when the court's treatment of the landlord's interpretation
is considered. The court looked to the following definition of "indem-
nify" from Black's Dictionary:
To restore the victim of a loss, in whole or in part, by payment, re-
pair, or replacement. To save harmless; to secure against loss or
damage; to give security for the reimbursement of a person in case of
an anticipated loss falling upon him. To make good; to compensate;
to make reimbursement to one of a loss already incurred by him.163
The court then selected certain language out of the indemnity provision
to conclude that it could be read to reimburse any and all losses or ex-
penses suffered by Lessor for any hazardous or toxic substances. 164 The
court then concluded that the provision was ambiguous. 165
The court's analysis may have been flawed when it assumed that, since
a sentence can be read in the disjunctive, it is ambiguous. This is not
necessarily the case. Indemnity provisions are almost always written in
this way. Thus, under this court's analysis, almost every indemnity might
be considered ambiguous. A better reading of the language may have
been that the indemnity covers both claims or demands asserted by third
parties or any losses suffered by the landlord, even if no third party
claims were asserted. It is not clear why the court did not consider this
possibility, which is what the language of the indemnity suggests when it
lists "claims, demands, losses or expenses." Claims or demands are typi-
cally those asserted by a third party. Losses or expenses could be the




163. Id. (citing Black's Law Dictionary 769 (6th Ed. 1990)).




result of a third party's actions or just those suffered by the landlord. The
language "asserted against or suffered by" also suggests that both third
party claims and losses suffered by the landlord in the absence of a third-
party claim are covered by this provision.
In reaching this conclusion, the court did not appear to apply rules of
contract construction or cases that have interpreted indemnities in Texas,
despite its statement that the rules of construction should be applied
before a decision on reasonableness is made. 16 6 The court held that be-
cause the jury ruled in favor of the landlord it must have agreed with the
landlord's view of the parties' intent. 167 The court concluded that this
interpretation led to the conclusion that both parties intended that the
tenant be required to perform "complete removal of toxic substances."' 68
iii. Nuisance Claims
The tenant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the
jury's finding that the tenant committed a nuisance. The issue of who
caused the release had already been addressed. The second challenge to
the nuisance claim was that there was no evidence of a condition interfer-
ing with the use and enjoyment of the landlord's property. The landlord
took the position that a nuisance was supported by evidence of the pres-
ence of MTBE and the releases over the years, by the tenant, of gasoline
"caused the encroachment of dangerous substances on [landlord's] prop-
erty.' 69 The landlord further argued that the presence of the contami-
nants only allowed the use of the property as a parking lot, which,
therefore, interfered with the use of the property.
The El Paso Court applied the test of nuisance cited by the tenant. The
court reviewed prior Texas court opinions to set out the three ways a
nuisance may occur:
(1) physical harm to property, such as encroachment of a damaging
substance or by the property's destruction;
(2) physical harm to a person on his property, such as an assault to
his or her senses or by other personal injury; and
(3) emotional harm to a person from the deprivation of the enjoy-
ment of his or her property, such as by fear, apprehension, offense,
or loss of peace of mind.' 70
The court then set forth the three types of activity that a defendant can
engage in to cause such a nuisance: (1) intentional invasion of another's
interests; (2) negligent invasion of another's interest; or (3) "other con-
duct, culpable because abnormal and out of place in its surroundings, that
it invades another's interests.'' 71
166. Id. at 540.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 541.
169. Z.A.O., 50 S.W.3d at 542.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 543.
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In reviewing the evidence in the record, the court concluded that the
landlord had not presented any evidence of any negligent or intentional
encroachment. Thus, the claim of nuisance could not stand on either of
those types of activity. Then, it looked to the question of whether the
activities were abnormal or out of place in the relevant surroundings. Be-
cause the parties addressed the issue of spillage in the lease, the court did
not believe spillage could thus be considered out of place or abnormal.
The court ruled there was no evidence on which the jury could have
based a claim of nuisance. 172
The fault of the landlord or its counsel was in addressing the negligence
question by factual evidence and expert testimony. In other cases re-
ported from appellate courts in Texas, counsel has failed to present ex-
pert testimony of the negligence of the defendant in environmental cases.
Many attorneys believe proving that the release or encroachment has oc-
curred and who the responsible party was is sufficient. However, more
than this must be proven. Counsel would be wise to research and attempt
to prove all elements of nuisance or challenge the failure to do so, if de-
fending such a case.
iv. Trespass
The tenant also challenged the factual and legal sufficiency of the tres-
pass claim. In this regard, the El Paso court relied upon the San Antonio
Court of Appeals' decision in Taco Cabana, Inc. v. Exxon Corp.173 to
address the question of whether a state agency's determination as to the
appropriate cleanup level foreclosed a tort cause of action to require fur-
ther clean up or to recover damages for failure to cleanup the property in
question. In the Z.A. 0. case, as in the Taco Cabana case, the court ruled
that where the TNRCC as an agency of the State of Texas has "deter-
mined the level of contaminants to be not unreasonable, a private cause
of action could not be maintained.' 74 Where an action level is not ex-
ceeded, these two courts of appeal have concluded that no breach of duty
may arise.
v. Malice
The other issue that was addressed was the question of the ability to
recover punitive damages against the tenant. The test for obtaining such
damages depends upon showing malice as defined by the Texas legisla-
ture. The test is one of intent to cause substantial injury or an act or
omission that involves "an extreme degree of risk.' 75 The court did not
believe that any evidence that a severe injury occurred had been
presented by the landlord. 76
172. Id.
173. 5 S.W.3d 773 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1999, pet. denied).
174. Z.A.O., 50 S.W.3d at 544.




4. Application of Statutes of Limitations
a. Temporary Damages to Property and Personal Injury Claims
In Nugent v. Pilgrim's Pride Corp.,177 the court reviewed the statute of
limitations for several causes of action. In this case, landowners Susan
and Ray Nugent filed suit against Pilgrim's Pride Corporation and Patrick
Pilgrim ("Pilgrim"), alleging trespass, temporary damage to their farm by
negligence or gross negligence, nuisance and personal injuries from de-
fendants' operation and dumping of noxious and toxic chemicals and
chicken waste on an adjoining site known as the Carpenter Place. The
Nugents alleged that rainfall and accompanying erosion carried the
chicken waste and chemicals onto their farm. The Nugents also claimed
that defendants' operation of a feedmill approximately a mile away from
their property constituted a nuisance depriving them of the use and en-
joyment of their property. The trial court granted summary judgment for
Pilgrim. The appellate court reversed the trial court's granting of sum-
mary judgment on the temporary damage to land, personal injury, tres-
pass and nuisance claims.17 8
The Nugents inherited their farm property in 1988, although they had
operated the farm as part of larger ranching operations since at least
1984. Defendant Pilgrim operated an adjoining farm, the Carpenter
Place. A creek flowed from the Carpenter Place onto the Nugent prop-
erty. Defendant disposed of large amounts of chicken litter and hatchery
waste on the Carpenter Place. Defendant also made heavy applications
of chicken waste material on a steep hillside just above the creek and
close by the Nugent property. Defendants tilled the hillside up and down
the hill, a practice the Nugents claim contributed to erosion of the hill-
side. When torrential rains fell in May of 1991, the rains washed silt and
chicken waste down the hill into the creek where it was carried onto the
Nugents' bottomland pasture. During the Summer of 1991, several of the
Nugents' cattle sickened and died. The Nugents had their land tested and
elevated levels of arsenic and selenium were found. These metals are
found in the waste from chicken production. Tests of two dead cattle also
pointed to arsenic poisoning.
However, the evidence also showed that the Nugents themselves had
agreed to spread chicken manure on their own land. Also, in September
1992, the Nugents saw a truck dump an oily substance in a pit uphill from
their farm. The Nugents entered the Carpenter Place and obtained sam-
ples for testing. These tests also showed high concentrations of toxic
chemicals, including toluene, arsenic, and fecal coliform bacteria. When
heavy rains resumed, silt, chicken manure, and waste oil from the Car-
penter Place washed onto the Nugents' land. In 1994, Susan Nugent was
diagnosed with skin cancer and chronic inflammatory demyelinating pol-
yneuropathy ("CIDP"). Ray Nugent also was diagnosed with CIDP and
177. 30 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2000, writ denied).
178. Id. at 565.
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suffered other health problems.1 79
The Nugents appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
Pilgrim. On appeal, Pilgrim contended that all of the Nugents' causes of
action were barred by the statute of limitations. In response, the Nugents
argued that the discovery rule delayed the start of the limitations period.
b. Property Damage Claims
At issue with regard to the property damage claim was whether the
damage to the Nugents' land was temporary or permanent. A suit for
damage to land and for personal injury must be brought not later than
two years after the cause of action accrues. 180 The accrual date depends
upon whether the damage is characterized as permanent or temporary.
An action for permanent damages to land accrues for limitations pur-
poses upon discovery of the first actionable injury. Pilgrim argued that
the damage to the Nugents' land was permanent beginning in May 1991
when the flooding of their land occurred. The Nugents argued that the
damage to their land was temporary and, therefore, they could recover
the damages sustained since the two years prior to filing suit.
In reviewing the distinction between permanent and temporary dam-
ages, the appellate court cited the Texas Supreme Court in Bayouth v.
Lion Oil Co.181 For permanent injury to land, the injury must be con-
stant and continuous, not occasional, intermittent or recurrent. Tempo-
rary injuries are found where the injury is not continuous but is sporadic
and contingent upon some irregular force such as rain.182
The court cited many Texas cases regarding the distinction between
temporary and permanent injury. The court noted the often cited case of
Atlas Chemical Industries, Inc. v. Anderson.183 In the Atlas case, the
plaintiff claimed temporary damages resulting from chemical deposits left
by water on his sixty-acre farm. There was evidence that the damage to
most of the sixty acres was not constant but occurred only during severe
winter floods and, at most, three to four acres along the creek had been
continuously affected by the polluted effluent. The court in Atlas found
the injury to be temporary, since the flooding of the sixty acres had not
been constant or continuous.
The court in the instant case against Pilgrim found the Nugents' injuries
to their land from Pilgrim's use of the Carpenter Place even more "spo-
radic," "occasional," and "intermittent" than the plaintiff's injuries in At-
las.' 84 As much as two years had passed between the flooding causing the
first overflow of chicken manure until the next overflow. In addition, the
court noted that another characteristic of a temporary injury is the ability
179. Id. at 565-67.
180. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
181. 671 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. 1984).
182. See Nugent, 30 S.W.3d at 567-68.
183. 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975).
184. Nugent, 30 S.W.3d at 571.
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of a court of equity to enjoin the injury-causing activity. An injury that
can be terminated cannot be a permanent injury. The court concluded
that the Nugents had proven that their claim of damage to their farm
resulted in temporary damage; therefore, the Nugents' damage to land
claim was not barred by the statute of limitations. 185
c. Nuisance Claim
The court held that a nuisance may arise by causing (1) physical harm
to property, (2) physical harm to a person on his or her property from an
assault on his or her senses or by other personal injury, and (3) emotional
harm from the deprivation of the enjoyment of his or her property
through fear, apprehension or loss of peace of mind.186 To be actionable,
the annoyance does not have to endanger health; it is sufficient if it is
offensive to the senses and renders the enjoyment of life and property
uncomfortable. 187 The court found that limitations will not bar a suit to
abate a continuing nuisance. The Nugents produced summary judgment
evidence that their property was damaged by successive overflows of
chicken manure and other waste material onto their property during the
two years immediately preceding the filing of their suit until the present
time. There was further evidence that their health had been injured, and
there was evidence to create a fact issue as to whether Pilgrim's conduct
had caused a well-founded apprehension of danger or unreasonable dis-
comfort or annoyance. 188
d. Trespass Claim
The court held that a trespass to real property is the unauthorized and
intentional entry on the land of another.189 Intent can be shown by proof
that, while the actor did not know his conduct would result in trespass, his
actions were practically certain to have that effect. The court found evi-
dence that Pilgrim dumped and spread unreasonably large amounts of
chemical and bacteria-laden chicken manure on the hillside upstream
from the Nugent farm and within a few hundred feet from the farm
boundary. Pilgrim also tilled the soil in a manner that encouraged the
erosion of the hillside and the migration of chicken manure and silt onto
the Nugent farm. Pilgrim also released material into the atmosphere that
contained contaminants which intermittently drifted onto the Nugent
property. These facts were sufficient to raise a fact issue as to whether
Pilgrim's actions amounted to trespass. The court also noted that the






189. Nugent, 30 S.W.3d at 571.
190. Id. at 576.
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e. Personal Injury Claims
The Nugents invoked the discovery rule with regard to their personal
injury claims, insisting that their injuries were not traumatic but latent
diseases that were inherently undiscoverable within the two years of the
first massive contamination of their property in 1991. Susan Nugent's
skin cancer was not diagnosed until 1994, but it was three years later
before a doctor identified the pollution as a probable cause of her ill-
nesses. Under Texas law, an action for personal injury must be brought
not later than two years after the date the cause of action accrues. 191
Generally, a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes some
legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later or all
resulting damages have not yet occurred. The discovery rule is an excep-
tion to the general rule.
Under the discovery rule, the accrual of the cause of action is delayed
until the plaintiff knows or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have known of the wrongful act and the resulting injury. In this case,
Pilgrim contended that the Nugents' personal injury cause of action was
barred since it was not brought within two years of the land's first being
flooded. Pilgrim argued that the "single action" rule should apply.
Under this rule, Pilgrim argued that the Nugents were required to file suit
for all of their injuries, for personal injuries as well as for real property
damage, within two years of May 1991. The single action rule provides
that there is but one cause of action and that all damages arising out of
defendant's wrongful action must be brought in one action.
The court, however, declined to apply the single action rule to nullify
the discovery rule. The court found that, to the ordinary person, there is
absolutely no relationship between a massive overflow of chicken manure
into a pasture and the later development of skin cancer and CIDP to
those who work on the land. The court ruled that these types of injuries
are simply not part of the sequence of events that might be anticipated
from the contamination arising from Pilgrim's alleged conduct. The court
found that a diligent plaintiff's mere suspicion or subjective belief that a
causal connection exists between his exposure and his symptoms is, stand-
ing alone, insufficient to establish accrual as a matter of law. Further, the
court ruled that because the Nugents were not aware of any of their con-
tamination-related illnesses before 1994, their suit was timely filed.1 92
5. Standing
a. A Claim for Property Damage Does Not Necessarily Transfer to
a Subsequent Landowner Without a Written Conveyance
Senn v. Texaco, Inc.193 involved claims by landowners, the Senns,
against oil and gas companies for alleged damages to land. The Senns
191. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 16.003(a).
192. See 30 S.W.3d at 574.
193. Senn v. Texaco, Inc., 55 S.W.3d 222 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2001, pet. denied).
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alleged that the oil and gas drilling and production activities of the de-
fendants caused both permanent and temporary injury to their land by
contaminating the aquifer underlying the land. The trial court granted
summary judgment to certain of the defendants. The Senns appealed the
grant of summary judgment claiming that the trial court erred in granting
summary judgment to the defendants, because (1) their causes of action
accrued for purposes of standing and limitations when they discovered
the contamination rather than when it occurred; (2) the issue of standing
as to temporary injury was not addressed; and (3) the prior owners of the
land conveyed their causes of action against the defendants for surface
damages to the Senns. The appellate court disagreed with these
arguments.
The facts showed that a revocable trust had conveyed the surface estate
to the Senns in 1997. It was undisputed that the defendants' drilling and
production activities had ceased before the trust conveyed the land to the
Senns. In their summary judgment motion, the defendants asserted the
rule in Texas that:
Where injury to land results from a thing that the law regards as a
permanent nuisance, the right of action for all the damages resulting
from the injury accrues to the owner of the land at the time the thing
that causes the injury commences to affect the land. 194
The court rejected the Senns' argument that the nature of the injury
called for the application of the discovery rule. The Senns contended
that, because they discovered the injury to the aquifer, they owned the
cause of action arising from the injury. The court found that the Senns
could have bargained for an assignment of the prior owner's possible
causes of action for injuries to the land that occurred before the purchase.
Furthermore, they could have insisted that the trust give them warranties
about the condition of the land and water in the deed. Also, the Senns
could have performed a better inspection of the land and water before
they purchased the property. The court found that the Senns lacked
standing to bring suit for any type of injuries to the land that occurred
prior to their purchase. Any injury to the land that the defendants might
have caused, whether temporary or permanent, occurred prior to the
Senns' purchase of the land. Therefore, the Senns did not own any causes
of action. The court also rejected the Senns' argument that the trust had
conveyed its rights against the defendants for surface damages. The court
relied upon the plain language of the deed in finding that there had been
no such conveyance. 195
C. COST RECOVERY ACTIONS UNDER THE TEXAS
SOLID WASTE DISPOSAL ACT
Another claim that frequently arises in environmental litigation be-





Disposal Act. This cause of action has not been reviewed in many opin-
ions issued by appellate courts in Texas. One of these opinions issued
during the Survey period was published, while the other one was not.
The question of contribution protection for settling parties was addressed
in a case that may be relied upon, while defining when a party may be
considered an arranger of disposal received interesting review but not
any binding precedent.
1. Contribution Actions Barred by Settlement with State
Compton v. Texaco Inc.196 was a case of first impression involving con-
tribution protection for parties who settle environmental contamination
claims with the State. The court decided whether Section 361.277(a) of
the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act barred Compton's claims for contri-
bution and indemnity against Texaco. The court also decided whether
Compton could assert common law indemnity claims against Texaco.
The asserted facts were as follows. From approximately 1929 to 1949,
Texaco operated a refinery on approximately 40.6 acres of land near San
Antonio, Texas (the "site"). WSI Properties, Inc. ("WSI") purportedly
purchased the property from Texaco "as is" in 1977. WSI, in turn, sold
the site to Winn's Stores, Inc. ("Winn's") for use as a corporate headquar-
ters and distribution center. Environmental contamination was evidently
discovered for the first time during the construction of Winn's corporate
headquarters. Later, it was also learned that underground petroleum
storage tanks installed by WSI for use at Winn's distribution center had
leaked causing additional contamination at the site. Both Texaco and
Winn's were identified by the TNRCC as potentially responsible parties
for the site's contamination.
Winn's filed for bankruptcy in 1994, and, as part of that proceeding, the
Liquidating Trust of Winn's Stores Inc. was formed with Compton as trus-
tee. The trustee and two prospective purchasers ultimately entered into
settlements with the State and received releases. Later, Texaco also en-
tered into a settlement with the State and agreed to be responsible for
remediating the site under the State's voluntary cleanup program. After
the trustee's settlement with the State, he brought suit against Texaco for
common law indemnity and statutory contribution under Section 344(a)
of the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act. The trustee sought to recover the
costs necessary to discover the extent of the environmental damage alleg-
edly caused by Texaco as well as the payments made to the State. Texaco
filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that the trustee was not
entitled to contribution or indemnity as a matter of law, because the
Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act protects parties who settle with the State
from those claims. Texaco also argued that the trustee's common law
indemnity claims failed as a matter of law. The trial court granted Tex-




aco's motion for summary judgment and ordered that Compton take
nothing. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's judgment.
a. Effect of Settlement under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act
The threshold issue decided by the court was whether Texaco's settle-
ment with the State barred Compton's claims for statutory contribution
under the Texas Solid Waste Disposal Act (hereinafter the "Act"). Sec-
tion 361.344(a) of the Act provides that "a person who conducts a re-
moval or remedial action that is approved by the commission and is
necessary to address a release or threatened release may bring suit in a
district court to recover the reasonable and necessary costs of that action
and other costs as the court, in its discretion, considers reasonable."' 197
Texaco contended that the language in its settlement agreement and the
language of Section 361.277(b) of the Act barred Compton's statutory
contribution claims.
Section 361.277(b) provides that "a person who enters a settlement
agreement with the state that resolves all liability of the person to the
state for a site subject to Subchapter F is released from liability to a per-
son described by Section 361.344(a) for cost recovery, contribution, or
indemnity under Section 361.344 regarding a matter addressed in the set-
tlement agreement."' 98 Texaco argued that Compton's claims were
barred as a matter of law under the plain language of Section 361.277(b).
Compton countered that the State's covenant not to sue did not take ef-
fect until the voluntary cleanup program issued the final Certificate of
Completion. Compton further argued that, because the release and cove-
nant not to sue were subject to conditions subsequent, the settlement
agreement did not resolve all of Texaco's liabilities for the site. The court
determined the language "resolves all liability" in Section 361.277(b).
In applying Section 361.277(b) to the settlement agreement, the court
found that the conditional nature of the covenant not to sue was not de-
terminative, especially in light of the immediate effectiveness of the
State's release of Texaco under the settlement agreement. The court re-
jected Compton's argument that Texaco's liability would not be resolved
until Texaco had fully performed its obligations under the settlement
agreement. This argument contradicted the plain language of the settle-
ment agreement and of Section 361.277(b). The court found that, if
Compton's interpretation were adopted, many settling parties would
likely be deprived of the protections of Section 361.277(b). Making a
party wait until a clean-up is fully completed before it is released from
liability would remove an important incentive to settle environmental lia-
bility with the State. The court held that Section 361.277(b) barred
Compton's claims against Texaco. 199
197. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.344(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
198. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.277(b) (Vernon Supp. 2000).
199. See 42 S.W.3d at 360.
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With regard to Compton's claim for common law indemnity, the court
noted that the Texas Supreme Court has explained that the comparative
negligence statute has abolished the common law doctrine of indemnity
between joint tortfeasors even though the statute does not expressly men-
tion that doctrine. The only remaining vestiges of common law indemnity
involve purely vicarious liability or the innocent product retailer situa-
tion. The court disagreed with Compton's classification of himself as an
"innocent retailer." Compton admitted that underground petroleum stor-
age tanks installed by Winn's predecessor, WSI, contributed to contami-
nation of the site. Compton further conceded that, as trustee, he was an
owner in the chain of title of the contaminated land. The court found that
while the trustee may not have caused any environmental pollution, nev-
ertheless, the trustee was strictly liable for the contaminated property as a
matter of law as an owner of the site.200 The court found that the only
defense to strict liability for an owner is as an "innocent purchaser" who
takes title without knowledge of contamination.20 1 Compton did not al-
lege or show that he was entitled to this exception. Because Compton did
not fall within either of the two categories available for non-contractual
common law indemnity, his claim for common law indemnity failed as a
matter of law.
2. Contribution Actions for Releases from Dry Cleaners and Other
Parties that Arrange for Disposal
In a case of first impression, the First District Court of Appeals of
Houston interpreted "arranger liability" under the Texas Solid Waste
Disposal Act ("SWDA").2 02 Using the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA") 203 as a model,
the Texas Legislature defined four types of persons responsible for solid
waste under the SWDA.204 One type of responsible person is an "ar-
ranger." An arranger is any person who makes arrangements, by con-
tract, agreement or otherwise, for processing, storing or disposing of solid
waste that it owns or possesses at a solid waste facility, or for transporting
such solid waste to a solid waste facility for processing, storing or
disposing.2 05
200. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.271(a) (Vernon Supp. 2000) (providing
that a party is "responsible for solid waste if the person: (1) is any owner ... of a solid
waste facility").
201. See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 361.275 (Vernon 1992).
202. R.R. Street & Co., Inc. v. Pilgrim Enterprises, Inc., No. 01-98-0142-CV, 2001 Tex.
App. LEXIS 6349 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 31, 2001, no pet.). In the appeal
by Pilgrim Enterprises, Inc. and related entities (collectively, "Pilgrim") and Jack J. Turk
and related parties, they contended that the jury's failure to find R.R. Street & Co., Inc.
("Street") liable under various common law theories was against the great weight and pre-
ponderance of the evidence. In addition, Pilgrim contended that the trial court erred in
granting Street's motion for directed verdict on Pilgrim's breach of fiduciary duty claim.
The appellate court overruled both issues.
203. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1997).
204. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.271(a) (Vernon 2001).
205. Id. § 361.271(a)(3).
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In this case, Pilgrim Enterprises, Inc. and related entities (collectively,
"Pilgrim") owned and operated several dry-cleaning plants at which the
dry-cleaning solvent perchloroethylene had contaminated the soil and/or
groundwater. R.R. Street & Co., Inc. ("Street") is a supplier of dry-
cleaning products and services. During Pilgrim's ownership and opera-
tion of these dry-cleaning plants, Street sold dry-cleaning solvents, includ-
ing perchloroethylene, and dry-cleaning equipment to Pilgrim. A Street
service technician, Harold Corbin, provided technical assistance and ad-
vice to Pilgrim regarding, among other things, operation of the equip-
ment, and waste management and disposal of the solvents. Pilgrim
alleged that such technical advice and assistance from Mr. Corbin made
Street liable as an "arranger" with respect to the perchloroethylene that
was released into the environment at its dry-cleaning plants.
In addition to other causes of action, Pilgrim thus brought a cost recov-
ery action under the SWDA 206 against Street requesting that the trial
court apportion its environmental cleanup costs against Street. Pilgrim
also brought similar causes of action against the other defendants with
whom Pilgrim settled before trial. The trial court, not the jury, decided
Pilgrim's SWDA claim against Street and in favor of Pilgrim.
With respect to the contribution claim, Street raised two issues on ap-
peal. First, Street contended that it was denied its constitutional right to a
jury trial when the trial court refused to submit Pilgrim's SWDA claim to
the jury.207 In its second issue, Street argued that it was not liable under
the SWDA, as a matter of law, because it is not a responsible person
under the act.20 8
In analyzing the first issue, the court made several findings. Pilgrim's
cost recovery action for an equitable share of its costs is a statutory con-
tribution action,209 and the right to contribution is based in equity.210 Al-
though common law does not ensure a right to a jury trial in equity,211
one provision of the Texas Constitution does ensure such a right. This
provision is contained in the Judiciary Article, Article V, Section 10.212
The Judiciary Article protects the right to a jury trial in all causes brought
in the district courts. 213 Thus, the question became whether Pilgrim's
SWDA claim is a "cause" under the Judiciary Article. Applying the
206. Id. § 361.344.
207. R.R. Street & Co., Inc., 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6349, at *7.
208. Id.
209. Id. at *9 (citing Compton v. Texaco, Inc. 42 S.W.3d 354, 362 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 2001, pet. denied)).
210. Id. (citing U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Century Indem. Co., 78 S.W.2d 737, 738 (Tex.
App.-El Paso 1935, writ dism'd); Brown & Root v. United States, 92 F. Supp. 257, 261
(D.C. Tex. 1950) (applying Texas law, court stated origin of contribution "lies in the ancient
doctrine of equity courts, now enforced at law, that those who are jointly liable will share
the burden equally").
211. Id. at *10 (citing Casa El Sol-Acapulco, S.A. v. Fontenot, 919 S.W.2d 709, 715 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1996, writ dism'd by agr.); Trapnell v. Sysco Food Servs., Inc.
850 S.W.2d 529, 543 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992), aff'd, 890 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1994).




broad meaning of "cause" adopted by the Texas Supreme Court in State
v. Credit Bureau of Laredo, Inc.,21 4 the court concluded that "a SWDA
cost recovery action, such as the one in this case, is a 'cause' for purposes
of the Judiciary Article. ' 215 The court, therefore, held that "there exists a
right to have a jury determine any fact issues that must be resolved with
regard to Pilgrim's entitlement to recover its cleanup costs from Street
under SWDA. '216
The court began its analysis of Street's second issue regarding Street's
liability under the SWDA as a responsible person by setting forth the
prima facie case for a cost recovery action under the SWDA. A plaintiff
must show that:
(1) the defendant is a "person responsible for solid waste" as pro-
vided in section 361.271;
(2) the TNRCC2 17 approved the remedial or removal action taken
by the plaintiff to clean up the property;
(3) the remedial or removal action is "necessary to address a release
or threatened release" of a solid waste into the environment;
(4) the costs of the remedial or removal action are "reasonable and
necessary;" and
(5) the plaintiff made reasonable attempts to notify the defendant of
the existence of the release and that it intended to take steps to elim-
inate the release.218
After these elements have been established, the court apportions the
costs of the remedial or removal action among the persons responsible
for solid waste by applying the equitable factors listed in Section 361.343
of the SWDA.219
The court applied this test to determine whether Pilgrim had estab-
lished all the elements of a cost recovery action under the SWDA or
whether such a determination required factual determinations to be made
by the jury. The court ruled that if Pilgrim conclusively established these
elements as a matter of law, then the trial court did not err in failing to
submit them to the jury.220 With respect to all elements, the court found
214. 530 S.W.2d 288, 292-293 (Tex. 1975) (broad meanings of "cause" include "any
question, civil or criminal, litigated or contested before a court or justice..." and "any
legal process which a party institutes to obtain his demand or by which he seeks his right")
(internal quotations omitted).
215. R.R. Street & Co., Inc., 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6349, at **12-13.
216. Id. at *13 (citing State v. Texas Pet Foods, Inc., 591 S.W.2d 800, 803 (Tex. 1979)
(stating that in an equitable proceeding, "ultimate issues of fact are submitted for jury
determination.").
217. "TNRCC" means the Texas Natural Resource Conservation Commission.
218. R.R. Street & Co., Inc., 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6349, at **14-15 (interpreting TEX.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.271, .344 (Vernon 2001)).
219. Id. at *15 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.343, .344 (Vernon
2001)).
220. Id. at *47 (citing TEX. R. CIv. PROC. 279; Stanley Boot Co. v. Bank of El Paso, 847
S.W.2d 218, 222-23 (Tex. 1992)); European Crossroads' Shopping Ctr., Ltd. v. Criswell, 910
S.W.2d 45, 56 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995, writ denied) ("When a party conclusively proves a
vital fact ... its effect is a question of law and there is no issue for the jury.").
2002] 1021
SMU LAW REVIEW
that Pilgrim had conclusively established them as a matter of law.221
The main challenge was whether Street was an arranger under the
SWDA and thereby a person responsible for solid waste. This decision,
although an unpublished opinion, is the first judicial guidance on how to
interpret this provision of the act. Considering that the wording of the
relevant provision of the SWDA is substantially similar to the wording of
comparable provision in the CERCLA, the court presumed that "the
[Texas Legislature] intended to adopt the construction placed on that
wording by the federal courts," and indicated that it would "look to fed-
eral cases as a guide in interpreting the state statute. '222
In reviewing these cases, federal courts have refused to apply a bright-
line test in determining arranger status. 223 Rather, the federal courts
have made case-by-case determinations, taking the "totality of circum-
stances" into consideration. 224 At a minimum, however, the federal
courts agree that a nexus must exist between the potentially responsible
party and the disposal of a hazardous substance that is based on the con-
duct of the potentially responsible party. 225 The common factors used by
federal courts in determining whether a sufficient nexus exists between a
potentially responsible party and the disposal of a hazardous substance,
for CERCLA arranger status to attach to the party, include whether the
potentially responsible party:
(1) had some actual involvement in the decision to dispose of the
waste or, alternatively, had an obligation to control the disposal of
the waste,
(2) engaged in the transaction for the purpose of waste disposal,
(3) owned or possessed the waste, or
(4) controlled the waste's disposal regardless of whether it owned or
possessed it.226
In determining CERCLA arranger status, a court may also consider
whether the potentially responsible party possessed the intent to dispose
of a hazardous substance at the time of a transaction. The Sixth Circuit in
United States v. Cello-Foil Products, Inc.227 concluded that the terms
"contract, agreement or otherwise arranged" indicate that a court must
"inquire into what transpired between the parties and what the parties
had in mind with regard to disposition of the hazardous substance. '228
221. Id. at **38, 48, 49, 57, 58, 59.
222. Id. at *21.
223. Id. at *24 (citing Freeman Assocs., L.P. v. Glaxo Wellcome, Inc., 189 F.3d 160, 164
(2d Cir. 1999)); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville and Denton R.R. Co., 142
F.3d 769, 775 (4th Cir. 1998); see also United States v. Cello-Foil Prods., Inc., 100 F.3d 1227,
1232 (6th Cir. 1996).
224. R.R. Street & Co., Inc., No. 01-98-0142-CV, 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6349, at *24
(citing Geraghty & Miller, Inc. v. Conoco, Inc., 234 F.3d 917, 929 (5th Cir. 2001)).
225. Id. at *25 (citing Geraghty & Miller, Inc., 234 F.3d at 929; General Elec. Co. v.
AAMCO Transmission, Inc., 962 F.2d 281, 286 (2d Cir. 1992)).
226. Id. at *29 (citing Sea Lion, Inc. v. Wall Chem. Corp., 974 F. Supp. 589, 595 (S.D.
Tex. 1996)).
227. 100 F.3d 1227 (6th Cir. 1996).
228. Id. at 1231.
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The Sixth Circuit does not believe that this intent inquiry undermines the
strict liability nature of CERCLA, because it is directed towards deter-
mining whether a party is a potentially responsible party, not whether a
party intended the damages caused by the disposal.229
To determine whether Street was an arranger under the SWDA, the
court considered the non-exclusive factors that the federal courts have
considered in making a similar determination under CERCLA.230 Using
these factors, the court found that neither Street's knowledge that per-
chloroethylene would be generated and possibly spilled at Pilgrim's
plants nor Street's role as a liaison between Pilgrim and the waste dispo-
sal company made it an arranger.231 However, the court concluded that
"Street, through Corbin, 'arranged' to dispose of solid waste by (1) in-
structing Pilgrim to pour its separator water into the sewer and (2) pour-
ing the [perchloroethylene]-mixture into Pilgrim's sinks and
commodes. '' 232 Mr. Corbin's actions satisfied the factors for determining
arranger status. The court found that "Corbin (1) took an active role in
the disposal of [perchloroethylene], (2) intended to dispose of the [per-
chloroethylene], (3) 'possessed' the perchloroethylene, and (4) controlled
the method and manner of the disposal. '233
Street argued that, for arranger status to attach to it, the SWDA also
requires that Street's conduct "caused" Pilgrim to incur environmental
cleanup costs. 234 Identifying a potentially critical difference in the state
and federal statutes, the court observed that although CERCLA appears
to have such a causation requirement, the SWDA does not have a similar
requirement for determining whether a plaintiff can sustain a cost recov-
ery action against a defendant. 235 Under the SWDA, a causation-like fac-
tor, however, is taken into consideration by a trial court in apportioning
costs after a defendant has been found to be a responsible person.236
Street further argued that the pouring of a perchloroethylene-mixture
into the sinks and commodes did not constitute disposal of a solid
waste.237 Street based its argument on the SWDA definition of solid
waste being subject to the limitations of the federal domestic sewage ex-
clusions found in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and in an
Environmental Protection Agency regulation. 238 The court concluded
that "neither the statutory nor the regulatory domestic sewage exclusion
applies to the [perchloroethylene]-wastes discarded by Corbin into the
229. Id. at 1232.
230. R.R. Street & Co., Inc., 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6349, at *30.
231. Id. at **31, 33, 34.
232. Id. at *38.
233. Id.
234. Id. at *45.
235. R.R. Street & Co., Inc., 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6349, at *45 (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a)(4) (1997); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 361.271, .344 (Vernon 2001)).
236. Id. at *46 (citing TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.343 (Vernon 2001)).
237. Id. at *39.
238. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 6903(27) (1997); 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.003(34)).
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sewer and that such conduct constituted 'disposal of solid waste."' 239 The
court based its conclusion primarily on the following findings: (1) domes-
tic sewage means sewage from a domestic source, not domestic sewage
from an industrial source;240 (2) "to allow industrial waste-generators to
avoid the reach of a cost recovery action by disposing of [their] waste
down the sewer, would, not only frustrate SWDA's statutory scheme, but
defeat the act's remedial purpose;"'241 and (3) the perchloroethylene-
waste found in the soil and groundwater at the Pilgrim sites was, at that
point, not mixed with domestic sewage and would never reach a publicly
owned treatment works. 242 Based on the court's analysis, Pilgrim had
shown that Street is a responsible person for solid waste and established
the other elements of a SWDA cost recovery action. The next step for
the trial court was to determine the amount of Pilgrim's cost recovery by
applying the equitable criteria listed in Section 361.343 of the SWDA. 243
However, any factual disputes relating to such equitable criteria should
be determined by a jury. Street contests (1) whether a causal relationship
exists between the perchloroethylene-wastes that Street arranged to be
disposed of at Pilgrim's facilities and the remedial actions conducted at
the sites, and (2) the volume of such wastes at the sites attributable to
Street.244 The court held that "the trial court erred in failing to submit
these issues to the jury and that the error probably did cause the rendi-
tion of an improper judgment. ' 245 The court, therefore, reversed the trial
court's judgment awarding Pilgrim damages under the SWDA and re-
manded the cause for the jury to determine the factual disputes and the
trial judge to determine the amount of damages.246
III. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The 77th Texas legislative session met in regular session during the Sur-
vey period. Unlike last session, which was relatively uneventful with re-
gard to environmental laws, this legislature enacted several major pieces
of environmental legislation. The key environmental legislation this ses-
sion is House Bill 2912, also known as the "TNRCC Sunset Bill." Among
other things, that bill renews the Texas Natural Resource Conservation
Commission ("TNRCC") for another twelve years until September 1,
2013. It also contains many substantive provisions, discussed below, that
will affect the scope of the TNRCC's authority, as well as its internal
administration. Several other environmental agencies were also subject
to sunset review during the session. For example, the Coastal Coordina-
239. Id. at *45.
240. R.R. Street & Co., Inc., 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6349, at *42 (citing Comite Pro
Rescate De La Salud v. Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Auth., 888 F.2d 180, 184 (1st Cir.
1989)).
241. Id. at *43.
242. Id. at *44 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 261.4(a)(1)(ii)).
243. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 361.343 (Vernon 2001).
244. R.R. Street & Co., Inc., 2001 Tex. App. LEXIS 6349, at *65.
245. Id.
246. Id. at *128.
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tion Council 247 and the State Soil and Water Conservation Board 248 were
also renewed until September 1, 2013.
The following summary discusses the highlights of the Sunset Bill and
the major environmental legislation enacted during the 77th Texas legisla-
tive session. Unless otherwise noted, all statutes became effective on
September 1, 2001.
A. THE TNRCC SUNSET BILL
Although the key component of the Sunset Bill is the renewal of the
TNRCC, there are many other important substantive parts of House Bill
2912. Below is a list of some of the most important provisions in the
Sunset Bill:
1. Name Change
Section 18.01 renames the TNRCC, as of January 1, 2004, the Texas
Commission on Environmental Quality.
2. Cumulative Risk
Section 1.12 requires the TNRCC to develop policies to protect the
public from cumulative risk in the media, including consideration of cu-
mulative impacts when issuing new permits or expansion permits, and to
give priority in enforcement and monitoring to areas in which regulated
facilities are concentrated.2 49
3. Website Information
Section 1.13 directs the TNRCC to post public information on the web,
including minutes of advisory committee meetings, permit and enforce-
ment action information, compliance histories, and emissions inventories
by county and account.250
4. Public Complaints
This provision requires the TNRCC to establish a process for educating
the public about the TNRCC's complaint policies and procedures (Sec-
tion 1.14);251 requires the TNRCC to provide a complainant with notice
at least quarterly regarding the status of the TNRCC's investigation (Sec-
tion 1.15);252 requires the TNRCC to coordinate complaint investigations
with local enforcement officials (Section 1.16);253 and requires the
247. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 33.211 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (House Bill 906 contin-
ued the Coastal Coordination Council until September 1, 2013).
248. TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. § 201.025 (Vernon Supp. 2002) (House Bill 2310 contin-
ued the State Soil and Water Conservation Board until September 1, 2013).
249. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 5.127-5.131 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
250. Id. at § 5.1733.
251. Id. at § 5.1765.
252. Id. at § 5.177.
253. Id. at § 5.1771.
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TNRCC to establish policies to allow for a timely response to after-hours
complaints (Section 1.16).254
5. Executive Director and Contested Case Hearings
Section 1.20 requires the TNRCC to adopt criteria for contested case
hearings in which the Executive Director may participate, and clarifies
that the purpose of the Executive Director's participation in hearings is to
complete the record.2 55
6. Performance-Based Regulation
Section 4.01 requires the agency by February 1, 2002, to develop a uni-
form definition of compliance history and a uniform standard for its use;
and it requires the agency by September 1, 2002, to develop a system for
enforcement actions, issuance of permits and development of innovative
programs that is based on a party's compliance history.256
7. Emission Events
Section 5.01 requires the development of a central database for track-
ing upset, maintenance, startup and shutdown emissions and establishes a
program for addressing excessive emission events at a facility through
permitting or corrective action.257
8. Grandfathered Facilities
Section 5.03 requires the permitting of grandfathered facilities; permit
applications must be submitted by September 1, 2003 if the facility is in
East Texas, or by September 1, 2004 if the facility is in West Texas; and
facilities in East Texas must be in full compliance with new permits by
March 1, 2007, or March 1, 2008 if the facility is in West Texas.258
9. Remediation
Section 11.01 provides that the TNRCC may not name a person as a
responsible party for an enforcement action or require a person to reim-
burse remediation costs for the site if the TNRCC has investigated the
site owned or operated by the person and has determined that 1) the
contaminants originate from an up-gradient, off-site source not owned or
operated by the person; 2) additional corrective action is not necessary at
the site; and 3) the TNRCC will not undertake formal enforcement action
regarding the site.2 59
254. Id. at § 5.1772.
255. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.228 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
256. Id. at §§ 5.751-5.757.
257. TEX. HEAL'rH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 382.0215, 382.0216 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
258. Id. at §§ 382.05181-382.05186.




Section 14.10 continues the Petroleum Storage Tank cleanup program
and fund until September 1, 2006 if certain deadlines are met by the party
seeking reimbursement. 260
11. Texas Environmental Health Institute
Section 19.01 creates the Texas Environmental Health Institute, which
is to be created jointly by TNRCC and Texas Department of Health with
the responsibility of investigating and providing treatment for illnesses
caused by Superfund contamination.261
12. Recycling Facilities
Section 9.03 clarifies the TNRCC's authority to require record-keeping
and reporting by recycling facilities.262
13. Sewage Sludge
Section 9.05 requires a permit issued on or after September 1, 2003 for
the land application of Class B sludge.2 63
14. Commissioner Qualifications
Sections 1.04, 1.05, 1.06 provide revised qualifications, training require-
ments, and removal procedures for Commissioners.
264
15. Advisory Committees
Section 1.10 provides that the composition of TNRCC-created or exec-
utive director-created advisory committees should have balanced repre-
sentation from interested groups.2 65
16. Research Plan
Section 1.11 requires the TNRCC to establish a long-term plan for the
research needs of the agency and to use that plan in contracting or pro-
viding grants for research.2 66
17. Accredited Labs
Section 1.12 allows the TNRCC to use only data from accredited labs
in most TNRCC decisions. Section 6.01 gives the TNRCC responsibility
for accrediting labs in accordance with the National Laboratory Accredi-
260. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 26.361 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
261. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 427.001- 427.006 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
262. Id. at § 361.119.
263. Id. at § 361.121.
264. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 5.052-5.054 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
265. Id. at § 5.107.





1. Senate Bill 5-Incentive Programs for Encouraging Emissions
Reductions
Under the federal Clean Air Act, the United States Environmental
Protection Agency ("EPA") is authorized to establish the maximum al-
lowable concentrations of pollutants that can endanger human health,
harm the environment, and cause property damage. Because much of
Texas does not satisfy the EPA's standards, Senate Bill 5 establishes sev-
eral incentive programs to encourage voluntary emissions reductions
above and beyond the reductions proposed in the State Implementation
Plan.
Senate Bill 5 establishes several programs that target diesel-engine and
motor vehicle sources. To address diesel-engine sources, the bill estab-
lishes the Diesel Emissions Reduction Incentive Program. 268 That pro-
gram provides grant funding to eligible projects that reduce emissions
from high-emitting sources, such as large trucks and construction equip-
ment, in nonattainment and near-nonattainment areas in Texas. The bill
also establishes the On-Road Diesel Purchase or Lease Incentive Pro-
gram, designed to encourage the purchase of large vehicles that meet
cleaner emission standards than otherwise required.269 Similarly, the new
Motor Vehicle Purchase or Lease Incentive Program provides grants for
the purchase of cleaner light-duty vehicles.270 To fund these incentives,
Senate Bill 5 establishes the Texas Emissions Reduction Plan Fund.271
The funds are raised from various sources, including surcharges on con-
struction equipment and certain on-road diesels and the registration of
truck-tractor or commercial motor vehicles.
In addition, Senate Bill 5 creates several other programs designed to
reduce emissions in Texas. The bill requires the Pubic Utility Commis-
sion ("PUC") to develop the Energy Efficient Grant Program to provide
for the retirement, replacement, and recycling of materials and appliances
that contribute to peak energy demand. 272 The bill authorizes the Texas
Council of Environmental Technology to implement a new technology
research and development program.273 The bill also establishes the Texas
Building Energy Performance Standards for construction in Texas. 274
267. Id. at §§ 5.801-5.807.
268. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 386.101-.113 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
269. Id. at § 386.112.
270. Id. at §§ 386.151-386.161.
271. Id. at §§ 386.251, 386.252.
272. Id. at §§ 386.201-386.207.
273. Id. at §§ 387.001-387.010.
274. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 388.001-388.008 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
[Vol. 551028
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
2. House Bill 2518-Hearing Notice Exclusion for De Minimus
Emissions Increases
House Bill 2518 amends the Health and Safety Code to provide an
exclusion for certain permit amendments from the standard public notice
and hearing requirements. To qualify for the exclusion, the total emis-
sions increase from all facilities authorized under the amended permit 1)
must meet the de minimus criteria defined by TNRCC rule and 2) must
not change in character.275 The bill also provides a similar notice and
hearing exclusion for applicants of agricultural plant permit amendments,
provided the total emissions increase from all facilities authorized under
the permit amendment 1) is not "significant" and 2) does not change in
character. Finally, the bill requires the agency, when considering a permit
amendment, to consider any adjudicated decision or compliance proceed-
ing within the five years prior to the application filing date that addresses
the applicant's air compliance history.276
3. Senate Bill 1390-Concrete Plant Emissions
Senate Bill 1390 requires the TNRCC to issue an emergency order sus-
pending operations of any concrete plant that performs wet batching, dry
batching, or central mixing that is operating without the necessary air
permit.277 The statute provides a $10,000 penalty for each day that a vio-
lation continues.278
4. Senate Bill 1561-Emissions Reductions in Mexico
Senate Bill 1561 authorizes the TNRCC to allow the use of emissions
reductions achieved outside the United States to satisfy otherwise appli-




1. Senate Bill 2-State Water Rights
Senate Bill 2 builds upon the major pieces of legislation over the past
two sessions, beginning with Senate Bill 1 in 1997, that have rewritten the
state's water rights law. Senate Bill 2 addresses the implementation and
financing of the water strategies and recommendations identified since
1997 by the sixteen regional water planning groups in Texas. One of the
primary purposes of the bill is the creation of the Texas Water Policy
Council to provide focus and recommendations on state water policy ini-
tiatives and the state's river authorities.280 Senate Bill 2 also requires the
275. Id. at § 382.0516.
276. Id.
277. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.5145 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
278. Id. § 7.052.
279. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.0172 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
280. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 9.001-9.017 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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Texas Water Development Board to complete groundwater availability
models for the major aquifers by October 1, 2004.281 The bill also ratifies
the creation of groundwater conservation districts and strengthens their
role in conserving groundwater resources by amending provisions regard-
ing the authority of such districts to adopt and enforce certain rules.
2. Senate Bill 687-Enhanced Penalties for Intentional Point Source
Discharges
Previously, the same penalties applied to intentional and unintentional
unauthorized point source discharges. Senate Bill 687 enhances the pen-
alties for intentional or knowingly unauthorized discharges of a waste or
pollutant into or adjacent to water in the state that causes or threatens to
cause water pollution.2 82 The bill took effect on June 14, 2001.
3. Senate Bill 3023-CAFO Permitting
Since the last legislative session, the Water Code has subjected an ap-
plication for a confined animal feeding operation ("CAFO") to a con-
tested case hearing if the CAFO is "sufficiently close" to a sole-source
surface drinking water supply. On the other hand, a permit application.
for a CAFO that is not "sufficiently close" is generally subject to a less
stringent permitting process. Senate Bill 3023 addresses concerns regard-
ing the ambiguity of the term "sufficiently close" by requiring the
TNRCC to designate a protection zone around a water supply.2 83
D. REMEDIATION
1. House Bill 1027-Brownfields Initiatives
The legislature passed House Bill 1027 to encourage the cleanup of
contaminated "brownfields" sites. The bill promotes brownfields pro-
grams by eliminating legal barriers preventing the use of property tax
breaks for contaminated sites, and by encouraging supplemental environ-
mental projects that involve the cleanup of such sites.284 The bill autho-
rizes the Texas Department of Economic Development to encourage the
cleanup of brownfields by certain industrial development corporations
through the use of sales and use tax proceeds. 285 In addition, the bill
authorizes the General Services Commission and other state agencies to
give preference, under certain circumstances, to goods produced at facili-
ties located on property remediated under the voluntary cleanup
program. 286
281. Id. at § 16.012.
282. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 7.145 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
283. Id. at § 26.0286(c).
284. Id. at § 7.067(a).
285. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5190.6 § 4B(p) (Vernon Supp. 2002).
286. TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 2155.449 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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E. PETROLEUM STORAGE TANKS
1. House Bill 2687-Extension and Modification of PST Program
House Bill 2687 makes several changes to the state's petroleum storage
tank ("PST") program. First and foremost, the bill ensures the continua-
tion of the PST program by extending the program's expiration date from
September 1, 2003 to the same date in 2006. The bill establishes certain
deadlines for persons performing corrective action under the program
and prohibits the use of account funds to reimburse an owner or operator
who misses a deadline.287 House Bill 2687 also modifies the definition of
"owner" to include a person who owns an aboveground storage tank. 288
F. MISCELLANEOUS
1. House Bill 3121-Modifications to the "Prop 2" Program
House Bill 3121 revises the TNRCC's "Prop 2" program that provides
a mechanism whereby a person may claim an exemption from ad valorem
taxation for all or part of real or personal property used to control pollu-
tion.289 House Bill 3121 requires the TNRCC to adopt specific standards
for considering applications to ensure uniform determinations regarding
whether property is used for pollution control. Some dispute has arisen
over the reasonable percentage to be exempted due to changes to or the
addition of new production equipment that results in an environmental
improvement. The new legislation provides that property used for the
production of goods and services shall not be exempt. It also establishes
an appeals process whereby either the applicant or the chief appraiser for
the appraisal district for the property's county may appeal an applicabil-
ity determination by the TNRCC.290
2. Senate Bill 1146-Website Consolidation
Senate Bill 1146 requires all state agencies that have jurisdiction over
matters related to environmental protection, quality, development, con-
servation, or preservation to cooperate with the Department of Informa-
tion Resources to develop a single information link through the Texas
Online portal.291 That effort will result in a single website that links all
available environmental and natural resources information.
3. Senate Bill 688-Direct Referral of Permit Applications to SOAH
Senate Bill 688 amends the permitting procedures created by House
Bill 801 from the 1999 legislature. Under the new bill, immediately after
the executive director issues a preliminary decision on a permit applica-
tion, either the permit applicant or the executive director may request
287. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 26.351, 26.3571 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
288. Id. at § 26.342.
289. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.31 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
290. Id.
291. TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 2054.127 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
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that the TNRCC refer the application directly to the State Office of Ad-
ministrative Hearings for a contested case hearing on whether the appli-
cation complies with all applicable statutory and regulatory
requirements.292 The bill also provides that a permit applicant is respon-
sible for publishing and paying for public notices of standard and multiple
plant permits for air emissions.293 The bill became effective on June 14,
2001.
4. House Bill 2997-Environmental Management Systems
House Bill 2997 requires the TNRCC to establish a comprehensive
program that provides regulatory incentives to encourage the implemen-
tation of environmental management systems ("EMS") by regulated enti-
ties, state agencies, local governments, and others. The term
"environmental management system" is defined broadly to include all
major EMS protocol such as ISO 14001.294 In addition, the commission
must integrate the use of EMS into its regulatory programs, develop EMS
for small businesses and local governments, and establish environmental
performance indicators to measure the program's performance. Finally,
the legislation requires that the commission consider the use of an EMS
in an applicant's compliance history for an applicant's facility for demon-
stration of compliance and potential use of an EMS to improve compli-
ance history.295 The TNRCC adopted rules implementing this program
in November 2001.
5. Senate Bill 356-Performance Measures for Innovative Programs
Over the past several sessions, the legislature has enacted many pieces
of legislation requiring the TNRCC to develop innovative programs that
encourage a broader approach to addressing environmental issues. Con-
cerns have been raised regarding the difficulty in determining whether
the innovative programs are achieving improvements in environmental
quality. Senate Bill 356 requires the TNRCC and the Legislative Budget
Board to work together to create adequate performance measures for all
TNRCC innovative environmental programs.2 96
6. Senate Bill 509-Asbestos Surveys
During the session, the Texas legislature amended the Texas Asbestos
Health Protection Act. That Act generally requires a survey for asbestos
containing building materials to be completed and any existing asbestos
to be abated before any demolition or renovation of a public or commer-
cial building. To address concerns about the general non-compliance with
this requirement the legislature passed Senate Bill 509.
292. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 382.05197 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
293. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 5.557 (Vernon Supp. 2002).
294. Id. at § 5.127.
295. Id. at § 26.028.
296. Id. at § 5.127.
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Under the new law, a municipality may not issue a renovation or demo-
lition permit for a public or commercial building unless (1) the applicant
provides acceptable evidence that an asbestos survey of the affected parts
of the building has been completed by a licensed asbestos surveyor or (2)
an engineer or architect has certified the lack of asbestos in the affected
parts of the building. 297 Building permit applications submitted after Jan-
uary 1, 2002 will be subject to the new requirements of Senate Bill 509.
297. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. Art. 4477-3a, § 13(b) (Vernon 2002).
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